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PROSPECT THEORY, RISK PREFERENCE, AND THE
LAW
Chris Guthrie*
INTRODUCTION
The corollary of the oft-repeated aphorism "nothing is certain but death
and taxes"' is that life is rife with uncertainty. When deciding whether to
enter into a contract or to take a precaution while driving or to settle a civil
dispute or to obey a particular law, we do not know how our decisions will
turn out. Will the other party perform his contractual obligations? Will the
precautions we take behind the wheel prevent us from causing harm to oth-
ers? Will we do better at the bargaining table or at trial? Will we get
caught and punished if we break the law?
Nearly every action we take and nearly every decision we make in-
volve consequences we cannot foresee. To understand how people behave
in an uncertain world, and to make viable recommendations about how the
law should try to shape that behavior, legal scholars must employ, even if
only implicitly, a model or theory of decisionmaking. Only with an under-
standing of how people are likely to respond to legal rules can legal schol-
ars, judges, legislators, and regulators promulgate rules that encourage
desirable behavior and discourage undesirable behavior. 2
Law and economics scholars have long used a decision theory called
"rational choice theory" or "expected utility theory" in their analyses of le-
gal behavior. 3 Rational choice theory, which describes how people would
behave if they followed the dictates of a series of logical axioms, posits that
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. B.A., Stanford, Ed.M., Harvard, J.D., Stan-
ford. I thank Tracey George, Tom Ulen, and participants at the Law & Society Association Annual
Meeting for comments on an earlier draft; the Hewlett Foundation and Stanford Law School for finan-
cial support; and David Collister and Johanna Harrington for research assistance.
I Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean-Baptiste Leroy (Nov. 13, 1789), in JOHN BARTLETT,
FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 310 (16th ed. 1992) (1855) ("Our Constitution is in actual operation; everything
appears to promise that it will last; but in this world nothing is certain but death and taxes.").
2 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1499 (1998) ("Nearly all interesting legal
issues require accurate predictions about human behavior to be resolved satisfactorily.").
3 See, e.g., Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 433, 436 ("The single most important contribution that law and economics has made to the law is
the use of a coherent theory of human decision-making ('rational choice theory') to examine how people
are likely to respond to legal rules.").
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people make outcome-maximizing decisions.' Rational-choice-based
analyses of law and legal behavior have been enormously influential, but
legal scholars have begun to question the wisdom of relying on them be-
cause there is "too much credible experimental evidence that individuals
frequently act in ways that are incompatible with the assumptions of' the
theory.'
Persuaded by this evidence, "behavioral law and economics" or "law
and psychology" scholars,6 as well as others who would not necessarily
place themselves in this camp, have begun to use an alternative decision
theory called "prospect theory"7 in their analyses.8 Developed by cognitive
psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, prospect theory is an
empirical theory that describes how people actually make decisions. Like
rational choice theory, prospect theory assumes that people try to maximize
outcomes; unlike rational choice theory, however, prospect theory posits
that people often fail to do so in systematic and predictable ways. Of great-
est relevance to this Article, prospect theory predicts that people generally
make risk-averse decisions when choosing between options that appear to
be gains and risk-seeking decisions when choosing between options that
appear to be losses. In short, people are often willing to take risks to avoid
losses but are unwilling to take risks to accumulate gains.
My primary purpose in this Article is to summarize some of the nas-
cent efforts by legal scholars to use prospect theory in their analyses of le-
gal behavior. I begin by describing prospect theory in Part I. Although
prospect theory includes several empirical observations about decisionmak-
ing, I focus on its central insight that people tend to view gains and losses
differently when making choices. After describing prospect theory, I ex-
plore in Part II some notable efforts by legal scholars to use it to analyze
4 For a thoughtful treatment of rational choice theory, see Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen,
Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 1051, 1060-66 (2000).
5 Id. at 1055. Some began questioning the rational actor assumptions on empirical grounds long
ago. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase
Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979).
6 Those writing in this field are variously referred to as "behavioral law and economics" scholars,
see, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behav-
ioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Cass Sunstein, Behavioral Law
and Economics: A Progress Report, I AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115 (1999), "new law and psychology"
scholars, see, e.g., Jeffery J. Rachlinski, The 'New' Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics,
and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000), "law and behavioral science" scholars, see,
e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 4, and "legal decision theorists," see Gregory Mitchell, Taking Be-
haviorism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1907, 1915 (2002). Whatever term is used, scholars writing in this field employ in-
sights from cognitive psychology to describe human behavior.
7 See infra Part 1.
8 The "prospect theory" described and discussed in this paper is not to be confused with the prospect
theory of patents developed by Edmund Kitch. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the
Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 267 (1977).
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decisionmaking in a number of doctrinal areas. I do not identify and de-
scribe every such effort, but I do assemble a diverse collection of some of
prospect theory's "greatest hits" in the legal literature. Finally, in Part ILL, I
acknowledge some concerns about the use of prospect theory in legal analy-
sis. Despite these concerns, I conclude that prospect theory is a valuable
tool that can inform law teaching, legal scholarship, and policymaking.
I. PROSPECT THEORY
In the preface to Choices, Values, and Frames, Nobel laureate Daniel
Kahneman9 describes the process by which he and Amos Tversky' ° devel-
oped their theory of decisionmaking."1 Driven by intellectual curiosity and
guided by intuitions about human behavior, Kahneman and Tversky pro-
ceeded as follows:
We would meet every afternoon for several hours, which we spent inventing
interesting pairs of gambles and observing our own intuitive preferences. If
we agreed on the same choice, we provisionally assumed that it was character-
istic of humankind and went on to investigate its theoretical implications, leav-
ing serious verification for later. This unusual mode of empirical research
enabled us to move quickly. In a few giddy months we raced through more
than twenty diverse theoretical formulations. 12
In 1975, Kahneman and Tversky labeled their emerging decision theory
"value theory."' 13 Following three years of refinements and a name change,
Kahneman and Tversky formally introduced "prospect theory" in their path-
breaking article, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, in
a 1979 issue of Econometrica.14 According to this "alternative account of
9 See, e.g., Daniel Altman, A Nobel That Bridges Economics and Psychology, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2002, at CI (reporting that Kahneman won the 2002 Nobel Prize in Economics).
to Had he been alive in 2002, Tversky would no doubt have shared the Nobel Prize with Kahneman.
See id
11 CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, at ix-x (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
12 Id. at x.
13 Id.
14 Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory]. For additional work
by Kahneman and Tversky on prospect theory, see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Val-
ues, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOL. 341, 342-44 (1984) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Choices]
(explaining prospect theory and risky choice); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of
Preferences, 246 SCI. AM. 160 (1982) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Preferences] (analyzing how
individuals evaluate risky options); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory:
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 297, 298 (1992) [hereinafter
Tversky & Kahneman, Advances] (extending prospect theory from risky decisions to uncertain deci-
sions); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice,
211 SCI. 453 (1981) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Framing] (providing an overview of prospect
theory); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent
Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039 (1991) (prospect theory and riskless choice); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251, S257-60 (1986) [hereinaf-
1117
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choice,"' 5 people make risky or uncertain decisions in the following four
ways:
First, people evaluate decision options relative to some reference point,
generally the status quo. When choosing between options that appear to be
gains relative to that reference point, people tend to make risk-averse
choices; 16 when choosing between options that appear to be losses, people
tend to make risk-seeking choices.' For example, people will generally
choose a definite $1,000 prize over a 50% chance at receiving a $2,000
prize but will opt to face a 50% chance at having to pay a $2,000 fine over
having to pay a definite $1,000 fine. This result is inconsistent with rational
choice theory, which generally assumes either risk neutrality or risk aver-
sion in the face of both gains and losses.' 8
Second, individuals' risk preferences tend to reverse when they are
faced with low-probability gains and losses. Individuals tend to make risk-
seeking choices when selecting between options that appear to be low-
probability gains and risk-averse choices when selecting between options
that appear to be low-probability losses. For example, when choosing be-
tween a definite $50 prize and a 5% chance at winning a $1,000 prize, indi-
viduals tend to make the risk-seeking choice and opt for the gamble.19
When choosing between paying a definite $50 fine and facing a 5% chance
at having to pay a $1,000 fine, individuals tend to make the risk-averse
choice and opt to make the sure payment.2 0 Again, this empirical finding
conflicts with rational choice theory, which generally assumes either risk
neutrality or risk aversion in the face of both gains and losses (whether low-
probability or not).2 '
ter Tversky & Kahneman, Rational Choice] (contrasting prospect theory and rational choice theory).
15 Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 14, at 263. Prospect theory is the most
prominent alternative decision theory. See, e.g., SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING 95 (1993) (observing that prospect theory is "the most widely accepted" alternative
to rational choice or expected utility theory).
16 See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, Advances, supra note 14, at 306. "A risk averter is defined as
one who, starting from a position of certainty, is unwilling to take a bet which is actuarially fair."
KENNETH J. ARROW, The Theory of Risk Aversion, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 90, 90
(1971).
17 See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, Advances, supra note 14, at 306. A risk seeker's preference is
the opposite of a risk averter's preference. That is, a risk seeker will reject "a sure thing in favor of a
gamble of lower or equal expectation." Kahneman & Tversky, Choices, supra note 14, at 341.
18 See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 113, 121 (1996) (noting that "[e]xpected utility theory predicts that people make either risk-averse
or risk-neutral choices").
19 See id
20 See id
21 See supra note 18. As demonstrated by these two empirical findings, people exhibit what Kah-
neman and Tversky later called a "fourfold pattern of risk attitudes": risk aversion for most gains, risk
seeking for most losses, risk seeking for low-probability gains, and risk aversion for low-probability
losses. ld. Kahneman and Tversky describe this "fourfold pattern" as prospect theory's "major empiri-
cal generalization about choice under risk." Id. at 307. For a detailed account of this "fourfold pattern,"
1118
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Third, individuals tend to value losses more heavily than gains of the
same magnitude. 22 As Kahneman and Tversky stated, "The aggravation
that one experiences in losing a sum of money appears to be greater than the
pleasure associated with gaining the same amount. '23 In fact, the available
empirical evidence suggests that losses generally loom at least twice as
large as equivalent gains. 24 Thus, a prospective $1,000 loss will have much
greater effect on a decision maker than a prospective $1,000 gain.25
Fourth, and finally, individuals tend to overvalue certainty. 26  People
"overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes
which are merely probable. '27 For example, most individuals prefer a defi-
nite prize of a one-week tour of England over a 50% chance at winning a
three-week tour of England, France, and Italy; yet when given a choice be-
tween a 5% chance at that three-week tour and a 10% chance at the week-
long tour of England, they prefer the chance at the three-week tour.28
Legal scholars have used all four components of prospect theory-
framing of ordinary gains and losses, framing of low-probability gains and
losses, loss aversion, and the certainty effect-to develop, or at least in-
form, various analyses of law and legal behavior. Here, I will focus primar-
ily on the first component of the theory: that individuals generally make
risk-averse choices when selecting between options framed as gains and
risk-seeking choices when selecting between options framed as losses. 29
see Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. Cti. L. REV. 163, 176-
81 (2000). Note that the risk patterns with respect to moderate-to-high probability gains and losses are
more stable and predictable than those with low-probability gains and losses. See id. at 178 n.64.
22 See, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 14, at 279.
23 Id.
24 See, e.g., Chip Heath et al., Goals as Reference Points, 38 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 79, 87 (1999)
(internal citations and parenthetical omitted) ("Studies of risky choice and riskless choice have presented
converging evidence that losses are weighted approximately two times more than equivalent gains.");
Richard H. Thaler et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, in THE WINNER'S
CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIc LIFE 63, 70 (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1992) (observ-
ing that the ratio of the slopes of the value function of small or moderate gains and losses is two to one).
25 For more on loss aversion and its implications (e.g., the endowment effect, the status quo bias),
see Russell Korobkin's contribution to this symposium. Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and
LegalAnalysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003).
26 Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 14, at 265.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 267.
29 The legal literature tends to use the terms "framing" or "framing effect" to refer to this phenome-
non. From a technical perspective, however, this term actually captures two related, but distinct, phe-
nomena: framing effects and reflection effects. See N.S. Fagley, A Note Concerning Reflection Effects
Versus Framing Effects, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 451 (1993).
Different choices caused by phrasing the same outcomes as though they were gains versus phras-
ing them as though they were losses is the framing effect," while the reflection effect involves
risky choices that do not have the same outcomes but "whose outcomes are opposite in sign (al-
though they do have the same magnitude).
Id.
1119
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II. APPLICATIONS TO LEGAL ANALYSIS
Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory is applicable to every area of
the law. From classic first-year law school subjects to advanced elective
courses, prospect theory sheds light on the way people behave in each legal
arena and the way legal doctrine has evolved. Below, I describe prospect
theory analyses in several doctrinal areas, beginning with subjects normally
encountered during the first year of law school (Civil Procedure, Torts,
Contracts, and Criminal Law) and concluding with subjects normally en-
countered thereafter (Professional Responsibility, Tax, Corporations, Secu-
rities, and Antitrust).
A. Civil Procedure
Civil procedure is the body of law governing how litigants resolve dis-
putes in the civil justice system. 30 Litigants and their lawyers must make
any number of risky decisions to resolve disputes, including deciding what
to claim, how to defend against those claims, what motions to pursue, what
evidence to discover, and whether to settle or proceed to trial. Behavioral
law and economics scholars have used prospect theory to shed light on the
way litigants, their lawyers, and even judges make these litigation deci-
sions.
1. Suit and Settlement.-Promulgated by the Supreme Court Advi-
sory Committee in 1938, Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
mandates that the Federal Rules "be construed and administered to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.' '3' The
Advisory Committee placed renewed emphasis on this mandate when it re-
vised Rule 1 in 1993 to require courts not only to "construe" the rules to se-
cure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of cases but also to
"administer" the rules in this fashion. 32 The Advisory Committee explained
that it revised Rule 1 "to ensure that civil litigation is resolved not only
30 Of course, most disputes are resolved before they ever enter the civil justice system. See Richard
E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW
& Soc'y REV. 525 (1981).
31 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. According to Charles Alan Wright and Arthur Miller: "There probably is no
provision in the federal rules that is more important than this mandate. It reflects the spirit in which the
rules were conceived and written, and in which they should be, and by and large have been, inter-
preted...." CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL 3D § 1029 (1987); see also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE I (3d ed. 1999)
("[T]he purpose underlying the establishment of most rules of civil procedure, in any judicial system, is
to promote the just, efficient, and economical resolution of civil disputes.").
32 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1, advisory committee's note. As Wright and Miller explain, "This addition is
to recognize the affirmative duty of the court to exercise its authority fairly and without undue cost or
delay. It continues the trend in the rules to recognize the management role of federal judges." CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1011 (2d ed. Supp.
2001). For more on the management role of federal judges, see Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982).
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fairly, but also without undue cost or delay."33
Despite the Advisory Committee's desire to ensure the speedy and in-
expensive attainment of justice, the labyrinthine structure created by the
rules virtually guarantees the opposite result. With provisions for liberal
pleading, expansive discovery, complicated motion practice, and mandatory
pretrial meetings, the Federal Rules require litigants to traverse pretrial and
trial processes that are almost invariably lengthy and costly.34 These proc-
esses "have produced skyrocketing litigation expenses" and have induced
parties to "settle lawsuits based on tactics and expenses as much as-if not
more than-their predictions of how a judge would apply law to fact. '35
Indeed, settlement is the norm in our civil justice system, and there is no
doubt that parties often settle to avoid the costs of continued litigation.
Attentive to the transaction costs imposed by the litigation process, law
and economics scholars have used rational choice theory to model litigant
decisionmaking. Promulgated by such prominent scholars as Robert
Cooter,36 John Gould,37 Benjamin Klein,38 William Landes, 39 Richard Pos-
ner,40 George Priest,41 Daniel Rubinfeld, 4 and Steven Shavell, 43 the eco-
nomic theory of suit and settlement posits that litigants are rational actors
who make risk-neutral or risk-averse 44 choices to maximize their outcomes
in litigation.45 The economic theory predicts that when deciding whether to
33 FED R. Civ. P. 1, advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
34 See generally Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in Civil
Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955 (1998).
35 Id. at 979; see also Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991) (arguing that "the
nature of our civil process drives parties to settle so as to avoid the costs, delays, and uncertainties of
trial, and, in many cases, to agree upon terms that are beyond the power or competence of courts to dic-
tate").
36 See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their
Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067 (1989) (reviewing the law and economics literature on litiga-
tion).
37 See John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973) (using eco-
nomic theory to explain the resolution of lawsuits).
38 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984) (using economic theory to describe which cases settle and which go to trial).
39 See William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971) (using
economic theory to explain litigation behavior in the criminal justice system).
40 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,
2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 399 (1973) (using economic theory to explain judicial administration).
41 See Priest & Klein, supra note 38.
42 See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 36.
43 See Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Meth-
ods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, II J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 56 (1982) (developing an economic model
of litigation to explain allocation of legal costs).
44 See, e.g., Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 36, at 1076 (assuming risk neutrality and risk aversion).
45 See, e.g., Priest & Klein, supra note 38, at 4 ("According to our model, the determinants of set-
tlement and litigation are solely economic, including the expected costs to parties of favorable or ad-
1121
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settle a case or to go forward to trial, litigants compare the value of settle-
ment to the expected value of trial and select whichever promises more.
Because the transaction costs associated with fully litigating a case gener-
ally exceed the costs of settlement, 46 litigants will settle virtually every civil
case because of the cost savings they expect to obtain.
47
Behavioral law and economics scholars accept the economic theory's
"premise that litigants try to achieve the best possible outcome," but they
question its "ability to identify the most favorable options when risk and
uncertainty are involved. '48 Because litigation is an uncertain process re-
quiring litigants to make risky decisions, behavioral law and economics
scholars contend that the economic theory's reliance on rational choice the-
ory is misguided. 49 Relying instead on prospect theory, behavioral law and
economics scholars have developed two litigation theories: the "framing
theory," which explains litigant decisionmaking in "ordinary" litigation,
and the "frivolous framing theory," which explains litigant decisionmaking
in "frivolous" or "low-probability" litigation.50
a. Ordinary Litigation.-Developed by Jeff Rachlinski 51 and
other scholars, 52 the framing theory posits that plaintiffs and defendants are
verse decisions, the information that parties possess about the likelihood of success at trial, and the di-
rect costs of litigation and settlement. The most important assumption of the model is that potential liti-
gants form rational estimates .... ").
46 See, e.g., Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 36, at 1075 (observing that "trial costs are so much
greater than settlement costs that many authors choose the simplifying assumption that settlement costs
are nil").
47 Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud explain the economic model as follows: "[T]he parties will set-
tle whenever the defendant's maximum offer is greater than the plaintiff's minimum demand. Because
litigation costs are added to the defendant's maximum offer and subtracted from the plaintiffs mini-
mum demand, settlement will normally occur. Indeed, if plaintiffs and defendants always agreed in their
predictions of trial outcomes, there would be no trials at all." Gross & Syverud, supra note 35, at 324.
48 Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 118.
49 Id. at 116 (observing that research shows "it is unlikely that the economic model accurately de-
scribes the behavior of litigants").
50 Guthrie, supra note 21, at 168 (describing "ordinary" litigation as litigation in which the plaintiff
has a moderate-to-high probability of recovering at trial and "frivolous" litigation as litigation in which
the plaintiffhas a low probability of recovering at trial). For a defense of this definition of frivolous liti-
gation, see id. at 185-87.
51 Rachlinski, supra note 18.
52 See ROBIN M. HOGARTH, JUDGEMENT AND CHOICE 105 (Wiley ed., 2d ed 1987) (observing the
Framing Theory pattern); Linda Babcock et al., Forming Beliefqs About Adjudicated Outcomes: Percep-
tions of Risk and Reservation Values, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 289 (1995) (applying prospect theory to
data obtained from negotiators involved in a hypothetical products liability case); Robin M. Hogarth,
Ambiguity and Competitive Decision Making: Some Implications and Tests, 19 ANNALS OPERATIONS
RES. 31, 38-41 (1989) (providing, experimental evidence consistent with the Framing Theory); Russell
Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Ap-
proach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 129-42 (1994) [hereinafter Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barri-
ers] (predicting that the framing of a settlement offer will affect settlement behavior); Russell Korobkin
& Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76
TEX. L. REV. 77 (1997) [hereinafter Korobkin & Guthrie, A New Look] (exploring lawyer and client
1122
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inclined to make different decisions in ordinary litigation because of the
way they are likely to perceive litigation options. In most lawsuits, plain-
tiffs choose either to accept a certain settlement from the defendant or to
proceed to trial in hopes of obtaining an even more favorable judgment.
Most defendants, by contrast, must choose either to pay a certain settlement
to the plaintiff or to pursue the gamble that further litigation will reduce the
amount they must pay. Thus, plaintiffs generally choose between options
that appear to them to be gains, while defendants generally choose between
options that appear to them to be losses. Consistent with prospect theory's
predictions regarding decisionmaking, the framing theory predicts that
plaintiffs are generally more likely to prefer settlement, the risk-averse op-
tion, while defendants are more likely to be attracted to trial, the risk-
seeking option.53
To demonstrate this phenomenon, Rachlinski presented a simple copy-
right litigation problem to law students, half of whom played the role of
plaintiff and half the role of defendant. 54 The plaintiff-subjects could either
accept a $200,000 settlement offer made by the defendant or face a 50%
chance of winning $400,000 at trial (and a 50% chance of winning noth-
ing); the defendant-subjects could either pay a $200,000 settlement to the
plaintiff or face a 50% chance of losing $400,000 at trial (and a 50% chance
of losing nothing).55 In this simple litigation problem, the plaintiff-subjects
thus faced a choice between two options with identical expected values: a
certain $200,000 settlement or an expected trial verdict valued at $200,000
(50% x $400,000 + 50% x $0 = $200,000). Like the plaintiff-subjects, the
defendant-subjects faced a choice between two options with identical ex-
pected values: a certain $200,000 settlement payment to plaintiff or an ex-
pected trial verdict valued at -$200,000 (50% x -$400,000 + 50% x $0 = -
$200,000).
The economic theory of suit and settlement predicts that both plaintiff-
subjects and defendant-subjects would be indifferent between the two op-
tions (assuming risk neutrality) or would prefer settlement (assuming risk
aversion). Consistent with the framing theory, however, Rachlinski found
that 77% of the plaintiff-subjects preferred settlement, the risk-averse op-
tion, while 69% of the defendant-subjects preferred trial, the risk-seeking
option.56 The defendant-subjects, choosing between options that appeared
to be losses, were induced to take risks that the economic theory would not
have predicted. Rachlinski 57 and others58 have found ample support for the
evaluations of settlement options); Peter J. van Koppen, Risk Taking in Civil Law Negotiations, 14 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 151 (1990) (offering empirical support for the Framing Theory).
53 See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 118-19.
54 Id. at 128-29.
55 Id. at 128.
56 ld. at 128-29.
57 Id. at 135-44.
58 See, e.g., Babcock et al., supra note 52, at 296-97; Hogarth, supra note 52, at 40-41; Korobkin &
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framing theory among experimental subjects and even among litigants in
actual cases.5 9
b. Frivolous Litigation.-Although the framing theory holds
true in most cases, it appears not to hold true in situations involving frivo-
lous litigation. In frivolous or low-probability litigation, the plaintiff typi-
cally chooses between a relatively small settlement amount and a low
likelihood of obtaining a much larger amount at trial. Defendants, by con-
trast, typically must choose either to pay some small settlement or face a
low likelihood of having to pay a much larger amount at trial. In short,
plaintiffs in frivolous suits typically confront decision options that appear to
be low-probability gains, while defendants choose between options that ap-
pear to be low-probability losses.60 Decisionmakers confronted with low-
probability gains, like plaintiffs in frivolous suits, tend to make risk-seeking
decisions, while those confronted with low-probability losses, like defen-
dants in frivolous suits, tend to make risk-averse decisions. 61 In short, liti-
gant risk preferences are likely to be reversed in frivolous suits, with
plaintiffs relatively more attracted to trial than are defendants.
To demonstrate this phenomenon, I presented a simple litigation prob-
lem to law students, half of whom played the role of plaintiff and half the
role of defendant. 62 The plaintiff-subjects could either accept a $50 settle-
ment payment or face a 1% chance at a $5,000 judgment at trial; defendant-
subjects could either pay a certain $50 settlement to plaintiff or face a 1%
chance at having to pay a $5,000 judgment at trial. 63 In this simple frivo-
lous litigation problem, the plaintiff-subjects faced a choice between two
options with identical expected values: a certain $50 settlement or an ex-
pected trial verdict valued at $50 (1% x $5,000 + 99% x $0 = $50). Like
the plaintiff-subjects, the defendant-subjects faced a choice between two
options with identical expected values: a certain $50 settlement payment to
plaintiff or an expected trial verdict valued at -$50 (1% x -$5,000 + 99% x
$0 = -$50).
The economic theory predicts that both plaintiff-subjects and defen-
dant-subjects would be indifferent between the two options (assuming risk
neutrality) or would prefer settlement (assuming risk aversion). Consistent
with the frivolous framing theory, however, I found that 62% of the plain-
tiff-subjects preferred trial, the risk-seeking option, while 84% of the defen-
dant-subjects preferred settlement, the risk-averse option.64 Faced with
low-probability gains, plaintiffs appear to make risk-seeking choices unan-
Guthrie, Psychological Barriers, supra note 52, at 130-42; van Koppen, supra note 52, at 158-64.
59 Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 150-60.
60 Guthrie, supra note 21, at 187.
61 See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
62 Guthrie, supra note 21, at 188-89.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 189.
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ticipated by the economic theory. In this and other experimental work,65 re-
searchers have found support for the frivolous framing theory's predictions
regarding litigant behavior in frivolous suits.
2. Judicial Management of Settlement.-What about judges? Prior
to the enactment of the Federal Rules in 1938, "parties preparing for trial
were generally left to their own devices. ' 66 With the adoption of the Fed-
eral Rules, however, judges began to play a much more active role "manag-
ing" pretrial litigation.67 In an influential article, Judith Resnik observed the
trend toward "managerial judging" with some alarm: "I believe that the
role of judges before adjudication is undergoing a change as substantial as
has been recognized in the posttrial phase of public law cases. ' 68 Specifi-
cally, "judges are not only adjudicating the merits of issues presented to
them by litigants, but also are meeting with parties in chambers to encour-
age settlement of disputes and to supervise case preparation.
69
Today, Resnik's insightful observations seem both quaint and pro-
phetic because the managerial role is now so firmly entrenched in the work
of federal trial judges. As Resnik herself explained in a subsequent article,
"[t]he 1938 Rules provided a vague category called the pre-trial and left it
utterly to the discretion of the district judge as to whether it would be filled
and if so, how," but by the 1990s, there was a "mandate that judicial in-
volvement with lawyers begin soon after the filing of lawsuits and continue
through conclusion." 70 Expressed most forcefully in revisions to Rule 16 7
and in the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,72 judges are now expected to
play an active role in the management and settlement of cases. 73 As Marc
Galanter and Mia Cahill have observed, judges now "actively intervene in a
significant portion of civil cases in American courts."
74
65 See id. at 189-90; see also Cynthia S. Fobian & Jay J.J. Christensen-Szalanski, Ambiguity and
Liability Negotiations: The Effects of the Negotiators' Role and the Sensitivity Zone, 54
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 277 (1993) (reporting experimental work con-
sistent with the Frivolous Framing Theory).
66 Resnik, supra note 32, at 391-92.
67 See generally id.
68 Id. at 378.
69 Id. at 376-77.
70 Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking on
Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV. 133, 187 (1997).
71 See, e.g., FED R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5) (giving the court discretion to "direct the attorneys for the par-
ties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for
such purposes as ... facilitating the settlement of the case").
72 See, e.g., Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471 (2000) (directing the court to imple-
ment a plan which would "improve litigation management"); id. § 473(a) ("Each court ... shall consider
and may include.., control of the pretrial process through involvement of a judicial officer... [or] au-
thorization to refer appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolution programs .... ).
73 See Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 58-60 (1992).
74 Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Set-
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In his study of lawyers' attitudes toward judicial intervention in settle-
ment talks, Judge Wayne Brazil found that "many lawyers believe that to be
successful as a settlement facilitator a judge must be fair; i.e., litigants and
lawyers must perceive him or her as impartial, open-minded, not identified
with one side or class of litigants, or with one perspective on debatable mat-
ters. '7 5 If judges are prone to framing effects, however, their ability to be
"fair" in settlement talks might be compromised by the manner in which
they perceive litigation options.
To explore whether judges are susceptible to framing effects when
managing settlement talks, Rachlinski, Judge Andrew Wistrich, and I gave
a large sample of federal magistrate judges a litigation problem involving a
copyright dispute.76 Under this hypothetical dispute between two mid-sized
publishing companies, the plaintiff-company alleges that the defendant-
company infringed on the plaintiff-company's copyright. The judges
learned that there is a 50% chance that the plaintiff-company will prevail at
trial and win $200,000 (and a 50% chance that the plaintiff-company will
not win anything at all). The judges also learned that each party will spend
$50,000 if the case goes forward to trial.77
Half of the judges reviewed the case from the plaintiffs perspective:
"You have learned that the defendant intends to offer to pay the plaintiff
$60,000 to settle the case. Do you believe that the plaintiff should be will-
ing to accept $60,000 to settle the case?"78 Thus, these judges learned that
the plaintiff-company faced a choice between a certain $60,000 gain or an
expected trial judgment of $50,000 (50% x $200,000 judgment + 50% x $0
judgment - $50,000 attorney's fees = $50,000 expected value).
The other half of the judges reviewed the case from the defendant's
perspective: "You have learned that the defendant intends to offer
$140,000 to settle the case. Do you believe that the defendant should be
willing to pay $140,000 to settle the case?"79 Thus, the judges in this group
learned that the defendant-company faced a choice between a certain
$140,000 loss or an expected trial judgment of -$150,000 (50% x -$200,000
judgment + 50% x $0 judgment - $50,000 attorney's fees = -$150,000 ex-
pected value).
Regardless of whether they assessed the problem from the plaintiffs
perspective or the defendant's perspective, the judges evaluated the pros-
pects of a litigant choosing between a settlement worth $10,000 more than
the expected value of trial. The only difference between the litigants was
dements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1342 (1994).
75 WAYNE D. BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL SUITS: LITIGATORS' VIEWS ABOUT APPROPRIATE ROLES
AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL JUDGES 56 (1985).
76 Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 796-97 (2001).
77 Id. at 796.
78 Id. at 796-97.
79 Id. at 797.
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that the plaintiffs options appeared to be gains ($60,000 settlement vs.
$50,000 trial) while the defendant's options appeared to be losses (-
$140,000 settlement vs. -$150,000 trial), due to the initial positions of the
parties. Consistent with prospect theory, we found that the framing of deci-
sion options influenced the judges' recommendations. Nearly 40% of the
judges assessing the problem from the plaintiffs perspective indicated that
they would recommend settlement to the plaintiff, while only 25% of the
judges assessing the problem from the defendant's perspective indicated
that they would recommend settlement to the defendant. 80
As demonstrated by this experiment, framing can negatively influence
judicial intervention in settlement talks. 1 The experimental evidence sug-
gests that judges are likely to perceive settlement to be more attractive to
plaintiffs than to defendants in ordinary litigation. This, in turn, suggests
that judges are likely to advocate settlement more strenuously for plaintiffs
than for defendants, even though the experimental evidence suggests that
plaintiffs are more likely than defendants to be attracted to settlement in the
first place. By urging plaintiffs to accept an amount that is less than appro-
priate or by failing to urge defendants to pay an appropriate amount, judges
could promote unfair settlements that undercompensate plaintiffs and un-
derdeter defendants. 82
B. Torts
Based on their review of prospect theory and other well-established
cognitive phenomena, Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar argue that "any legal
concept that relies in some sense on a notion of reasonableness or that is
premised on the existence of a reasonable or rational decisionmaker will
need to be reassessed in light of the mounting evidence that a human is 'a
reasoning rather than a reasonable animal.' 83 Reasonableness is a concept
that pervades tort law. Not surprisingly, then, several legal scholars have
used prospect theory and other cognitive phenomena to analyze tort doc-
trine, including the negligence standard, comparative fault, the doctrine of
informed consent, and products liability doctrines.
80 Id.
81 Framing can also affect other forms of dispute resolution, including, for example, mediation. See,
e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psy-
chology To Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 269, 309-12,
338 (1999); Joseph B. Stulberg, Trainer Accountability, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 77, 80
(2000).
82 Guthrie et al., supra note 76, at 798.
83 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market
Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 634-35 (1999) (quoting Alexander Hamilton, in Laurence, J. Pe-
ter, PETER'S QUOTATIONS: IDEAS FOR OUR TIME 315 (1977)). But see Gregory C. Keating, Reason-
ableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1996) (distinguishing between
"reasonableness" and "rationality").
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1. Negligence Standard.-Negligence, the primary basis for liability
in tort, is generally determined by the so-called "reasonable person" stan-
dard. According to this familiar doctrine, a defendant (or plaintiff) will be
held responsible for harm caused by her negligent conduct if she failed to
behave as a reasonable person would have behaved under the circum-
stances. 84 This hypothetical reasonable person is often assumed to be a ra-
tional actor who performs implicit (if not explicit) cost-benefit analyses and
takes action only where the benefits of doing so exceed the costs. 85
Conformity "with reasonable-person standards of behavior requires ra-
tionality and control over one's own risk-taking behavior; '86 yet, as Steve
Croley observes, prospect theory and other cognitive phenomena demon-
strate that people often make irrational risky decisions because of the way
they perceive their decision options. 87 Holding imperfectly rational people
to the "reasonable person" standard is akin to imposing absolute or strict li-
ability on them. As Croley states, "negligent conduct should be expected
when tort law's negligence test-embodied by the reasonable person-sets
an ideal standard that, applied to nonidealized individuals, is sometimes
tantamount to a strict liability standard. ' 88  Based on this observation,
Croley questions the fairness of holding people liable under the reasonable
person standard as well as the efficacy of expanding individual tort liability
as a means of deterring unsafe conduct. 89
2. Comparative Fault Versus Contributory Negligence.-Prospect
theory also illuminates the influence that a comparative fault regime can
have on the resolution of negligence cases. At common law, a defendant
could escape liability for negligence in any circumstance in which the plain-
tiffs own negligence contributed to his accident.90 By the 1960s and
1970s, however, most jurisdictions had abandoned these contributory negli-
gence regimes in favor of comparative fault.91 In a comparative fault re-
gime, a plaintiffs negligence results in a reduced recovery rather than no
84 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 ("Unless the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to
which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.").
85 See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort: On the Sources and Limits of Employee
Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1705, 1726 n.73 (1996).
86 Id. at 1725.
87 Id. at 1719-23.
88 Id. at 1728.
89 Croley reaches the tentative conclusion in this article that deterrence is better achieved through
enterprise liability than through expanded individual liability. Id. at 1738 ("Even though firms cannot
monitor their agents perfectly (to say the least), it seems possible that the palpable and day-to-day influ-
ence that a firm would have on its individual agents would curb unreasonable decisionmaking by those
agents more than would the prospect of personal tort liability. Or at least that is the question.").
90 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 494 (2000).
91 See id. at 503-04 (noting that Mississippi enacted the first comparative negligence statute in
1910, but that most states enacted comparative negligence in the 1960s and 1970s).
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recovery at all.92 Suppose, for example, that a defendant negligently injures
plaintiff, that plaintiffs own negligence is deemed 25% responsible for his
injuries, and that plaintiff incurred $100,000 in damages. In a contributory
negligence regime, the plaintiffs negligence would preclude him from re-
covering any damages at all. Under comparative fault, by contrast, the
plaintiff recovers $75,000, which is the full damage amount reduced by the
amount that reflects his relative contribution to the accident.
Comparative fault regimes vary from state-to-state. Some states have
adopted a "pure" comparative fault regime in which plaintiff can recover no
matter how much responsibility she bears for the accident, 93 but most states
follow an "incomplete" or "modified" comparative fault rule94 in which the
plaintiff can recover provided her negligent contribution to the accident is
either less than (in about a dozen states) 95 or equal to but not greater than (in
about twenty states) the defendant's negligence. 96  Regardless of the ap-
proach adopted by a particular jurisdiction, comparative fault is more for-
giving than contributory negligence because it does not bar recovery. Most
scholars have identified this as the primary virtue of comparative fault re-
gimes.97
Another scholar, Gail Hollister, used prospect theory to highlight an
additional virtue of comparative fault. According to Hollister, comparative
fault is more likely than contributory negligence to induce defendants to
settle. 98 To develop this argument, Hollister analyzed two studies, one pub-
lished in 195999 and the other in 1969,100 both of which assessed the impact
of comparative fault on tort cases in Arkansas. In both studies, researchers
found that a majority of lawyers believed that the abandonment of contribu-
92 Id. at 503 ("Under a pure comparative fault regime, the rule merely reduces the amount of the
award to a plaintiff who is chargeable with contributory fault.").
93 Id. at 505 ("Around a dozen states as well as the major federal statutes adopt this system.").
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., id. at 494 ("The traditional contributory negligence rule was extreme not merely in re-
sults but in principle. No satisfactory reasoning has ever explained the rule. It departed seriously from
ideals of accountability and deterrence because it completely relieved the defendant from liability even
if he was by far the most negligent actor." (footnote omitted)); William L. Prosser, Comparative Negli-
gence, 41 CAL. L. REV. 1, 37 (1953) (observing that "the desirability of the division of damages" made
possible under a comparative fault regime "speaks for itself'); Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and
Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE L.J. 697 (1978) (proposing a faimess-based rationale
for comparative fault).
98 Gail D. Hollister, Using Comparative Fault To Replace the All-or-Nothing Lottery Imposed in In-
tentional Tort Suits in Which Both Plaintiff and Defendant Are at Fault, 46 VAND. L. REV. 121, 170-72
(1993).
99 Maurice Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A 'Before and After'Survey, 13 ARK.
L. REV. 89 (1959).
100 Note, Comparative Negligence-A Survey of the Arkansas Experience, 22 ARK. L. REV. 692
(1969) [hereinafter 1969 Study].
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tory negligence for comparative fault had influenced settlement rates.' 0' Of
those who shared this belief, 75% in the 1959 study 0 2 and 91.8% in the
1969 study'0 3 believed that comparative fault had increased the likelihood
of settlement. In short, "[t]he proportion of cases settled prior to trial [was]
definitely greater under the new rule than under the contributory negligence
rule."10
4
To explain this apparent'05 increase in settlement rates under compara-
tive fault, Hollister turned to prospect theory. 0 6 As applied to ordinary liti-
gation, prospect theory demonstrates that plaintiffs are generally drawn to
settlement, while defendants are drawn to trial. 07 Trial is more appealing
to defendants because it offers them the prospect of avoiding a loss. That
prospect is greater in a contributory negligence jurisdiction, where a defen-
dant can avoid liability altogether by establishing that plaintiff was negli-
gent, than in a comparative fault jurisdiction, where a defendant who
establishes that plaintiff was negligent can only reduce the damages it must
pay. A defendant, in other words, has a better chance of escaping loss in a
contributory negligence regime than in a comparative fault regime. This
suggests that defendants are more likely to find trial attractive (and settle-
ment unattractive) in a contributory negligence regime than in a compara-
tive fault regime. Thus, comparative fault appears not only to be more just
than contributory negligence but also to increase the likelihood that negli-
gence cases will settle.
3. Informed Consent.-The informed consent doctrine first appeared
in 1957 when the California Court of Appeals decided Salgo v. Leland
Stanford, Jr., University Board of Trustees. 0 In Salgo, the court stated that
a physician could be held liable for failing to provide a patient with suffi-
cient information to enable that patient to make an informed decision about
medical treatment.10 9 Since Salgo, courts have struggled to conceptualize
the informed consent doctrine, but the basic idea has become an intuitive
one: a patient can recover in negligence if she suffered an injury caused by
101 Rosenberg, supra note 99, at 99 (reporting that 61.2% of the lawyers surveyed observed an im-
pact on settlement); 1969 Study, supra note 100, at 702 (reporting that 70% of the lawyers surveyed ob-
served an impact on settlement).
102 Rosenberg, supra note 99, at 99.
103 1969 Study, supra note 100, at 702.
104 Id.
105 1 use the term "apparent" because the authors of the study relied on attorneys' perceptions of set-
tlement rates rather than actual settlement data. The attorneys may have been mistaken.
106 Hollister, supra note 98, at 170 (arguing that prospect theory explains why "defendants were less
willing to settle when there was a possibility of totally avoiding liability by proving the plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence").
107 See generally supra Part I I.A. La.
108 317 P.2d 170 (1957).' For one take on the birth of the informed consent doctrine in Salgo, see
Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Laws Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137, 149-50 (1977).
109 317 P.2d at 181.
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her physician's failure to disclose relevant information about medical
treatment. 10
Because the law treats a cause of action based on the informed consent
doctrine as a species of negligence, the plaintiff-patient must generally
prove duty, breach, causation, and damages. This means that the plaintiff-
patient must establish: that there was a doctor-patient relationship (duty);
that the doctor failed to provide requisite information about the treatment
(breach); that if the doctor had provided this information, the plaintiff-
patient would have made a different treatment decision (causation); and that
the plaintiff suffered physical injury as a consequence of the non-disclosure
of information (damages). I"'
Causation is the critical element. To establish causation, the plaintiff-
patient must prove that she would have made a different treatment decision
and thereby avoided injury if her doctor had provided her with the relevant
information. Thus, the law requires the judge or jury to assess whether the
plaintiff would actually have made a different decision. Aaron Twerski and
Neil Cohen question whether the judge or jury can make this determination
given what cognitive psychologists have learned about the way the presen-
tation of information influences decisionmaking: 112 "[T]o hypothesize what
decision a patient would have made if provided with additional informa-
tion-as we must if we are to determine causation-is highly conjectural
unless we are sure how the information would have been framed.", 13
To illustrate their point, Twerski and Cohen describe a study published
in the New England Journal of Medicine."l4 In that study, researchers asked
three groups of subjects-students, patients, and doctors-to imagine that
they had lung cancer and that they had to decide based on the information
presented by the researchers whether to undergo surgery or radiation treat-
ment. The researchers provided the subjects with identical information, but
they framed it differently: some of the subjects learned the probability of
survival (e.g., a 68% chance of living), while others learned the probability
of mortality (e.g., a 32% chance of dying). Consistent with prospect theory,
the researchers found that the framing of the options systematically influ-
enced the subjects' decisionmaking. 15 The researchers observed that this
effect was "substantial" and evident in all three subject populations, even
among the doctors." 16
110 DOBBS, supra note 90, at 653 (noting that "unless patients are incapacitated, they are entitled to
material information about the nature of any proposed medical procedure").
I See, e.g., id. at 654.
112 See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The
Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 626-27.
113 Id. at 635.
114 See Barbara J. McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies, 306 N.
ENG. J. MED. 1259 (1982).
115 ld. at 1261.
116 Id. at 1262. People might frame medical treatment options differently from financial options.
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Because patients' decisions are likely to vary depending on how in-
formation is presented, Twerski and Cohen argue that courts cannot realisti-
cally assess causation in an informed consent case. They explain:
The law does and can only consider the information the health profes-
sional ... should deliver. It does not and cannot consider the multitude of fac-
tors that influence the way people actually make decisions. To decide
causation without looking at the latter is wholly illusory. On the other hand, to
insist on such an inquiry would involve the courts in the kind of investigation
of human behavior that would severely compromise the judicial process.17
Twerski and Cohen propose a reconceptualization of the informed consent
doctrine. Under their view, the plaintiff suffers a compensable injury
whenever a doctor compromises the plaintiffs decision process, regardless
of the decision outcome. They state:
Rather than focusing on personal injury damages flowing from the hypotheti-
cal "but for," which seeks to determine what the plaintiff would have decided
had the defendant provided the information, we suggest that courts should
identify and value the decision rights of the plaintiff which the defendant de-
stroyed by withholding adequate information." 8
In short, given the practical difficulties associated with the justiciability of
causation in informed consent cases, Twerski and Cohen argue that "[t]he
legal system should protect these [process] rights and provide significant
recompense for their invasion, rather than continue its single-minded and
ill-considered attention to personal injuries allegedly caused by the lack of
information."" 9
4. Products Liability.-Like the law of informed consent, products
liability law is concerned in part with the provision of information to con-
sumers. Although most products liability law and scholarship rest on ra-
tional-actor assumptions about the information-processing abilities of
consumers and manufacturers,' 1 0 Hanson and Kysar have recently written a
series of articles in which they argue persuasively that these rational-actor
See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 6, at 2009 (arguing that "the specific context or subject matter of the
framing problems ... may exert significant effects on behavior").
S17 Twerski & Cohen, supra note 112, at 608.
I Id. at 609.
119 Id. Although they do not discuss this in the context of a potential cause of action based on in-
formed consent, Barbara McNeil and her colleagues argue that physicians and patients might be able to
improve patient decisionmaking and minimize the effects of decision framing on the patients. They
suggest that "an awareness of the effects of presentation among physicians and patients could help re-
duce bias and improve the quality of medical decision making" and that "additional data, discussions, or
analyses are probably needed" to increase the likelihood of informed patient decisionmaking. McNeil et
al., supra note 114, at 1262; see also Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899,
948-51 (1994) (arguing that risk information could be presented in such a way as to improve patient
comprehension).
120 See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 83, at 638.
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assumptions are misplaced.12' Building on earlier scholarship by Howard
Latin1 22 and others, 123 Hanson and Kysar develop a three-part argument
about products liability doctrine.
Drawing from cognitive psychology, Hanson and Kysar begin by argu-
ing that consumers are likely to misperceive the risks posed by potentially
dangerous products. Although they acknowledge that this research does not
yield "an overall prediction about the manner in which consumers will per-
ceive product risks," 124 they conclude that consumers "are subject to a host
of cognitive biases," including framing,125 which make them susceptible to
manipulation. 126
Because consumers are susceptible to manipulation, Hanson and Kysar
contend that product manufacturers use advertising, promotions, and price
setting to shape consumer perceptions and thereby induce them to underes-
timate product risks: 127
Once it is acknowledged that consumer risk perceptions may be affected by, for
instance, the manner in which information is framed, then it becomes inevitable
that manufacturers will exploit those framing effects in a way that maximizes
manufacturer profits. Other things being equal, it is in the manufacturer's inter-
est for consumers to have the lowest estimate of product risks possible: The lower
the consumer's risk estimate, the more consumers will be willing to pay for the
product, leading to greater sales and increased profits for manufacturers.128
Many products liability scholars have argued that product safety ought
to be regulated by requiring manufacturers to provide adequate warnings, 129
but Hanson and Kysar believe that product warnings do not go far enough
to protect easily swayed consumers. Because consumers are prone to mis-
perceive risks, and because manufacturers will inevitably take advantage of
121 Id.; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to Mar-
ket Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 262 (2000) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, A Re-
sponse]; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of
Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999) [hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence].
122 See Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1193 (1994) (arguing that product warnings are an insufficient substitute for safer product designs
given consumers' inability to appreciate product risks).
123 See, e.g., Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for
Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683 (1993); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Ciga-
rettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163 (1998); Jon D.
Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enter-
prise Liability, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (1990).
124 Hanson & Kysar, The Problem, supra note 83, at 722.
125 Id. at 684-87, 739-42.
126 Id. at 723.
127 ld. at 637.
128 Id. at 724. Hanson and Kysar provide real-world evidence in their second article documenting
efforts by manufacturers to manipulate consumers. See Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence, supra note
121.
129 Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence, supra note 121, at 1424.
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them, Hanson and Kysar argue that the legal system should impose enter-
prise liability on manufacturers. 30 This, they contend, would decrease, if
not eliminate, manufacturers' incentives to manipulate consumer prefer-
ences through the framing of product risk information.' 3
C. Contracts
"Contracts concern the future," Melvin Eisenberg observes, "and are
therefore always made under conditions of uncertainty."'' 32 Rational choice
theory posits that a contracting party confronted with uncertainty "will ration-
ally select the option that maximizes his subjective expected utility," but
"empirical evidence shows that actors characteristically violate the standard
rational-choice or expected-utility model," due to what Eisenberg calls "the
limits of cognition."' 33 Legal scholars like Eisenberg have analyzed contract
law, including the so-called "bargain-limiting principle" and the adequate as-
surance of performance doctrine, in light of these "limits of cognition."
1. Bargain-Limiting Principles.-Contract law generally calls for
courts to enforce contracts according to their terms. 3 4 This basic principle,
which Eisenberg labels the "bargain principle," has limits. In fact, "contract
law sets a variety of limits on the full enforcement of bargain promises," in-
cluding, for example, the doctrines of unconscionability, duress, and mis-
representation. 135 Although some of these doctrines exist to prevent one
party from exploiting the other, many others, according to Eisenberg, "are
best explained on the basis of the limits of cognition."'' 36
One doctrine Eisenberg explains and justifies using "the limits of cog-
nition" is the "liquidated damages" doctrine. Although courts generally en-
force explicit contract terms, they are reluctant to enforce liquidated
damages provisions, which call for the payment of a specified sum in the
event of a breach. Courts only enforce such provisions if the party seeking
enforcement can establish both that actual damages were difficult to esti-
mate at the time of contracting and that the specified amount of damages
was or is reasonable. 137
130 Id. at 1560. Hanson and Kysar's proposal has had its share of critics, even among some who
otherwise accept their characterizations of consumer behavior. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise Liability, 6
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213 (2000). Hanson and Kysar respond to their critics in Hanson & Kysar,
A Response, supra note 121.
131 Hanson & Kysar, Some Evidence, supra note 121, at 1560.
132 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV.
211,213 (1995).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 211.
135 Id. at 212.
136 Id.
137 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-718(l) (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981).
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Scholars and judges applying rational choice analyses argue that courts
should enforce liquidated damages provisions because they reflect cost-
benefit calculations made by the parties.138 Relying on prospect theory and
other "limits of cognition," Eisenberg argues that contracting parties are, in
fact, often unable to properly assess the costs and benefits of a liquidated-
damages clause due to the uncertainties present at the time of contracting. 139
Because parties will not "act with full cognition to rationally maximize
[their] subjective expected utility," Eisenberg concludes that "special scru-
tiny of liquidated damages provisions is justified because such provisions
are subject to the limits of cognition in a special way."' 40 (Eisenberg also
refers to the limits of cognition to explain the cooling-off period in door-to-
door sales,' 41 the excuse of express conditions, 142 and certain special kinds
of contracts, like form contracts. 143)
2. Adequate Assurance of Performance Doctrine.-Larry Garvin
uses prospect theory and other cognitive phenomena to analyze the ade-
quate assurance of performance doctrine in contract law.144 Under the ade-
quate assurance doctrine, a promisee who believes with reasonable certainty
that the promisor will have difficulty performing his obligations under the
contract can demand assurances from the promisor that he will perform. If
the promisor provides inadequate (or no) assurances, the promisee may treat
the contract as repudiated. 45 Adequate assurance is "really a sort of forced
modification, compelling the recipient of the demand to grant ex post rights
which the bargain ex ante had not provided."' 46
Garvin argues that courts and scholars have neglected to provide a sat-
isfactory justification for the adequate assurance doctrine and that its "real-
location of risk is facially dubious, and could provide the insecure party
138 According to Judge Richard Posner in Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co.: "[T]he parties
will, in deciding whether to include a penalty [liquidated damages] clause in their contract, weigh the
gains against the costs ... and will include the clause only if the benefits exceed those costs .... 769
F.2d 1284, 1289 (7th Cir. 1985) (parenthetical omitted). Scholars who employ rational choice theory to
analyze liquidated damages also assume that parties, not courts, are in the best position to calculate
damages in the event of a breach. See, e.g., Lewis A. Komhauser, An Introduction to the Economic
Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 720-21 (1986).
139 Eisenberg, supra note 132, at 227-28.
140 Id. at 230. For another attempt to use cognitive psychology to analyze liquidated damages, see
Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theoty in Legal Analysis: The Case of Liqui-
dated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717 (2000).
141 Eisenberg, supra note 132, at 220.
142 Id. at 236-40.
143 Id. at 240-48; see also Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under Informational Asymme-
try: The Effect of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 391, 424-35 (1990) (incorporating
framing into an economic analysis of form contracts).
144 Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of Risk, Duress, and Cognition, 69 U.
COLO. L. REV. 71 (1998).
145 U.C.C. § 2-609 (1995).
146 Garvin, supra note 144, at 74.
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with a windfall." 147 Garvin elaborates on the problem posed by adequate
assurance as follows:
Adequate assurance is a first cousin to contract modification. If the party de-
manding assurances actually gets them, it has in essence secured a change in
the express terms. Even the promisor's unsupported promise that it will in fact
perform goes beyond the bargain, in that the parties could have, but did not, ar-
range for periodic reassurance. Any greater assurance-paying in advance, or
granting a security interest, or giving progress payments-gives the promisee
more than it had when the contract was made. In essence, then, the promisee
uses the mechanism of adequate assurance to secure a new contract, one that it
had not bargained for and that, almost by definition, it could not get voluntar-
ily from the promisor.148
Despite this problem, however, Garvin argues that the cognitive phenomena
described by Eisenberg and modeled by Kahneman and Tversky provide a
justification for the doctrine because they show that contracting parties are
unlikely to make sound risk assessments at the time of contracting. And
"[i]f parties in fact cannot deal well with risk ex ante, then a greater case
can be made for adjustments to risk ex post."'1 49 Moreover, parties are
unlikely to invoke the doctrine opportunistically because of the way they
will frame their decision options:
When the promisor's performance is in question, the promisee inevitably will
frame its decision in terms of loss-do we cut our losses now by demanding
assurances, or do we give the promisor some extra time to resolve the situa-
tion? By demanding assurances, the promisee imperils future transactions
with the promisor, so there is a real risk to a demand. The promisee, framing
the problem as a choice of losses, will probably choose, ceteris paribus, the
riskier option-going ahead with the deal. 150
For these reasons, Garvin concludes that framing and other cognitive phe-
nomena provide some justification for the adequate assurance doctrine and
provide some insight into its appropriate limits. 15'
D. Criminal Law and Plea Bargaining
From contemplating whether to commit a crime to deciding whether to
plead guilty upon arrest, criminal behavior (and its aftermath) involves risk-
taking. As such, criminal law offers fertile ground for prospect theory-
based analyses, yet relatively little such work has been done. One scholar,
147 Id.
148 Id. at 130 (footnotes omitted).
149 Id. at 74-75.
1S0 Id. at 159.
151 Garvin also uses prospect theory and other phenomena from cognitive psychology to analyze
disproportionality in the award of consequential damages. See Larry T. Garvin, Disproportionality and
the Law of Consequential Damages: Default Theory and Cognitive Reality, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 339
(1998).
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however, has undertaken a prospect theory-based analysis of plea bargain-
ing.
Plea bargaining has long been a common practice in the criminal jus-
tice system. In his definitive account of the history of criminal justice in
America, Lawrence Friedman reports that "[p]lea bargaining was common
in state after state in the twenties. In the federal courts, plea bargaining ap-
parently became standard practice in or around 1916; by the years 1927
through 1930, it had swept everything before it."'1 52 Today, upwards of
ninety percent of all criminal cases result in pleas.153
Plea bargaining appears to contradict a central tenet of prospect the-
ory.'54 When criminal defendants are arrested and charged, they can choose
either to accept "a certain loss of liberty or property" by entering into a plea
agreement, or they can take their chances at trial in hopes of avoiding any
loss at all. Because they face prospective losses, prospect theory predicts
that most criminal defendants will make the risk-seeking choice and opt for
trial, yet we know that most defendants opt instead to resolve their cases
through pleas. What accounts for this apparent contradiction?
Richard Birke proposes four potential solutions to this puzzle. 155 First,
Birke suggests that criminal defendants might be uniformly risk averse as a
population. If so, criminal defendants would find the certainty of plea bar-
gains appealing and would be put off by the uncertainty of trial. Although
some criminal defendants might be risk averse, most of them (at least those
actually guilty of committing crimes) would seem to be relatively more
risk-seeking than the population as a whole given their willingness to bet
that they can commit crimes and get away with it. Thus, Birke concludes,
"the suggestion that criminals are unfailingly risk averse strains credulity"
and cannot resolve the contradiction. 56
Second, Birke suggests that criminal defendants might perceive the
trial-versus-plea-bargain decision as one involving gains rather than losses,
and if so, their risk-averse behavior would be consistent with prospect the-
ory.' 57 Individuals adapt quickly to gains and losses and Birke suggests that
defendants might enter "the domain of loss at the time of apprehension."
158
If so, "the defendant expects to be punished after being caught, and by the
time the prosecutor offers a plea bargain, the defendant has assimilated the
loss and adjusted to a baseline to reflect the expectation of punishment.' ' 59
152 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 390 (1993).
153 See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation To Resolve Criminal Cases: A Procedural
Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1304 n.221 (1994).
154 See Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205, 207.
155 Id. at 208-10.
156 Id. at 245.
157 Id. at 244.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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Although this explanation might account for the plea-bargaining behavior
of some criminal defendants, Birke observes that there is something coun-
terintuitive about perceiving a prospective punishment as a gain. Thus, he
concludes, this is at best a partial explanation. 60
In his third attempt to reconcile plea bargaining rates with prospect
theory, Birke proposes that prosecutors may simply be offering such good
deals that even risk-seeking criminal defendants are inclined to take
them.' 6 1 "If the utility value of the plea is much higher than that of trial,"
Birke explained, "the plea offer may overcome a tendency toward loss aver-
sion. ' 162 If, for example, a criminal defendant can plead guilty to sexual as-
sault with a three to five year sentence or face a 50/50 chance of a rape
conviction with a fifteen to twenty-five year sentence, he might opt for the
plea simply because it greatly exceeds the expected value of trial. Nonethe-
less, Birke concludes that this explanation is unlikely to account for the plea
bargaining-prospect theory discrepancy. For doctrinal, political, and practi-
cal reasons, it is unlikely that prosecutors are routinely offering such attrac-
tive deals.
Thus, Birke proposes a final explanation for the high rate of plea bar-
gaining--criminal defendants are induced to plead guilty due to the way
prosecutors frame their offers:
Defendants plead because they are misinformed about the values of trials and
pleas, and because pleas are framed as gains. Defendants are manipulated into
pleading because they possess too little information to overcome framing ef-
fects inherent in the valuation of pleas and trials, and because they lack infor-
mation to accurately value that which they so readily trade away-the right to
trial. Naturally, defense attorneys respond to incentives of the court that en-
courage pleas, and these responses manifest themselves as information that
distorts defendants' views of their alternatives. Trial looks worse than it really
is, and so the plea looks relatively better.1 63
Although Birke contends that each of his accounts might help resolve the
apparent inconsistency between prospect theory's predictions and the rate
of plea bargaining, he finds the latter explanation most compelling and ar-
gues that the criminal justice system should attempt to address the way
prosecutors manipulate the information that they present to criminal defen-
dants. 64
160 Id. at 244-45.
161 Id. at 219.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 247.
164 Another possibility is that the conventional framing account simply does not apply to decisions
involving the prospect of confinement the same way it applies to decisions involving prospective mone-
tary losses. See Mitchell, supra note 6, at 2009.
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E. Professional Responsibility
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct,1 65 along with the numerous
state codes of professional conduct based upon them, 166 prohibit lawyers
from engaging in a wide range of behaviors deemed unethical.' 67  Despite
such prohibitions, there is a widespread perception among members of the
bar and the public at large that unethical conduct is common in the legal
profession. Various commentators have lamented that "lawyers, their eth-
ics, and their professionalism are 'lost,' 'betrayed,' in 'decline,' in 'crisis,'
facing 'demise,' near 'death,' and in need of 'redemption.""'1 68 Indeed, after
four years of study, an ABA Commission has proposed, and the ABA
House of Delegates has approved, revisions to the Model Rules motivated
in part by "increased public scrutiny of lawyers," "persistent concems about
lawyer honesty, candor and civility," and "the need to enhance public trust
and confidence in the legal profession."' 1
69
Lawyers who violate ethical rules may suffer reputational harm, face
disciplinary action by the state bar, incur civil liability for legal malpractice,
and may even face criminal liability for violations of related penal codes.
Given these risks, why, or under what circumstances, would a lawyer en-
gage in unethical conduct? If policymakers can identify the circumstances
under which a lawyer is more likely to violate ethical rules, policymakers
may be able to craft rules tailored to address those circumstances. Rational
choice theory predicts that lawyers will violate ethical rules only when the
expected benefits of violating a rule (e.g., better result for client and lawyer)
exceed the expected costs (e.g., probability of detection multiplied by the
165 In this Article, I will cite to the 2003 version of the Model Rules. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT (2003).
166 According to the Executive Summary of the report issued by the ABA Commission on the
Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, forty-two jurisdictions have adopted some version of
the Model Rules. See COMM'N ON THE EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, ABA,
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: CHANGES THE COMMISSION PROPOSED (2001) [hereinafter RULES REVISION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY], available at www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-exec_summ.html.
167 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2003) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a
client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent .... "); id.
at R. 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
unless there is a basis ... for doing so that is not frivolous .... ); id. at R. 3.4(a) ("A lawyer shall not:
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a
document or other material having potential evidentiary value."); id. at R. 4.1 ("In the course of repre-
senting a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a
third person; or (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid
assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client .... ); id. at R. 4.4 ("In representing a client, a lawyer
shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.").
168 Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology
Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1257 (1995) (citing sev-
eral sources); see also Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 283
(1998).
169 RULES REVISION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 166.
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formal and informal sanctions that would be levied). Although prospect
theory assumes that lawyers will weigh the costs and benefits of their con-
duct, prospect theory predicts that lawyers' behavior will also be influenced
by the way they believe the relevant case or transaction is progressing.
When things appear to be going well (gains), risky ethical violations will
seem unattractive; when things appear to be going poorly (losses), however,
those same ethical violations will hold more appeal. 170
Richard Painter develops this argument in an article on concealment.' 71
Painter begins his analysis by observing that "[a] lawyer may be more
likely to assist a client who is using the lawyer's services to violate the law
in situations where the facts are already bad, either for the client, for the
lawyer or for both."'7 To illustrate, Painter alludes to two cases: SEC v.
National Student Marketing Corp. ' 73 and In re Carter & Johnson. 174
In the National Student Marketing Corporation case, National hired at-
torneys to facilitate its merger with another company. During their repre-
sentation of National, the attorneys learned that National had overstated its
earnings in prior financial statements. Rather than going back to the share-
holders of the two companies to get approval of the merger in light of this
discovery, the attorneys allowed the deal to go forward without the new ap-
provals. Shareholders later sued the attorneys, and the court found that the
attorneys' failure to obtain appropriate approvals of the deal had violated
the Securities and Exchange Act.' 75
In Carter, attorneys Carter and Johnson represented National Tele-
phone during a two-year period in which National Telephone repeatedly
violated securities laws against the advice of their attorneys. In a subse-
quent prosecution of Carter and Johnson, the SEC ruled that the attorneys
had an obligation to take affirmative steps to correct National Telephone's
violations, and because they had not done so, they were liable under the Se-
curities and Exchange Act.
Explaining the lawyers' behavior in these two cases, Painter writes:
An important deal about to collapse, as in SEC v. National Student Marketing,
or an ongoing securities fraud by a nearly insolvent client, as in In re Carter
and Johnson, are already no-win situations for lawyers bound to lose their cli-
ent, their unpaid legal bills and possibly their reputation. Lawyers who never
170 See generally Richard W. Painter, Lawyers' Rules, Auditors' Rules and the Psychology of Con-
cealment, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1399 (2000); Rachlinski, supra note 18.
171 Painter, supra note 170.
172 Id. at 1421 (parenthetical omitted).
173 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
174 Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,847, at 84,145 (Feb.
28, 1981).
175 For Painter's analysis of a novel based on this case, see Richard W. Painter, Irrationality and
Cognitive Bias at a Closing in Arthur Solmssen 's The Comfort Letter, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. I 1111
(2000).
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would have facilitated the conduct that got their clients into trouble to begin
with (and who even advised against the illegal conduct), when deciding how to
cut their losses, may help conceal the client's violations and take other risks
that a "rational" lawyer would not. 176
Painter thus concludes that prospect theory may account for the lawyers'
behavior in these cases and "generally may explain why, sometimes, the
worse things get, the more likely a lawyer is to compound his own and his
client's troubles with violations of ethics rules, violations of law or both."'1 77
Consistent with Painter's analysis, Rachlinski reported experimental
evidence demonstrating that those assuming the role of lawyer may be more
likely to behave unethically when faced with a bad situation than a good
situation. Rachlinski presented a litigation problem to law students as-
signed to assume the role of counsel for a defendant pharmaceutical com-
pany in a hypothetical products liability suit.1 78 The subjects learned that
the parents of a child allegedly injured by a drug manufactured by the de-
fendant had sued the defendant for damages. The subjects further learned
that the plaintiffs had recently offered to settle the case for $3 million. Un-
known to the plaintiffs, however, the defendant had discovered and with-
held several relevant, incriminating documents during the discovery
process. The subjects learned that they could be sanctioned if they agreed
to settle the case without disclosing the documents to plaintiffs. 179
Rachlinski randomly assigned half of the subjects to a "gains" condi-
tion. Subjects in this group learned that their client, who had originally ex-
pected to have to pay plaintiffs $5 million to settle the case, believed the
case was "going well." Subjects assigned to the "losses" condition learned
that their client, who had originally expected to pay plaintiffs only $1 mil-
lion, believed that the case was "going poorly." Rachlinski asked subjects
in both groups to indicate whether they would agree to accept the plaintiffs'
offers and settle the case. 180
Although the subjects faced the same decision of whether to settle the
case for $3 million prior to disclosing relevant and incriminating docu-
ments, the framing of the decision problem affected subjects' willingness to
engage in risky, and arguably unethical, behavior. Only 12.5% of the sub-
176 Painter, supra note 170, at 1421-22.
177 Id. at 1422. Painter also observed that prospect theory might "explain why lawyers take big
risks to conceal their own errors [not merely client errors]." Id.
As risk averse as lawyers are when tempted with the gains of assisting a client crime or fraud to
begin with, once they are pressured into participation in the client's misconduct, or because of
their own negligence fail to notice it in time, they may be willing to bear the additional risk of
concealing the problem by lying or telling half truths to outside auditors, to regulators, or even to
their own client's board of directors.
Id.
178 Rachlinski, supra note 18, at 140.
179 Id. at 141.
180 Id. at 142.
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jects assigned to the gains condition (the case is going well) indicated that
they would engage in the ethically risky behavior of settling prior to dis-
closing. By contrast, 45% of those assigned to the losses condition (the
case is going poorly) indicated that they would settle before disclosing."'
Consistent with the predictions of prospect theory, Rachlinski found that
subjects facing losses were much more likely (nearly four times as likely!)
to adopt a risk-seeking, and ethically dicey, litigation strategy. Although
the subjects might not have known whether settling before disclosing vio-
lated the governing ethical rules, "settling before a party can find out un-
pleasant facts about one's case smacks of impropriety and unfairness."' 8 2
Many of the subjects appeared willing to sacrifice ethical principles in an
attempt to avoid incurring losses.
F. Tax: Compliance and Enforcement
The U.S. income tax system requires taxpayers to pay a percentage of
their income to the federal government. Prospect theory may tell us when
taxpayers are more or less likely to comply with this requirement.
Tax compliance is a significant public policy issue. Although most
Americans pay their taxes in full, 183 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) es-
timates that it fails to collect about 17% of total federal income taxes due. 8 4
In 1992, this amounted to an estimated $95 billion:185 a figure greater than
the amount appropriated that year to the Departments of Interior, Justice,
Labor, State, and Housing and Urban Development combined! 186
The IRS has expansive enforcement powers, but it has insufficient re-
sources to ensure that all taxpayers comply with the tax laws. As of 1995,
the IRS audited fewer than two percent of taxpayers,8 7 and only a small
percentage of those audited were penalized for underpayment.' 88 To collect
as high a percentage of taxes as possible, the IRS needs to be able to predict
I81 ld.
182 Id.
183 See James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818, 820 (1998) (estimat-
ing, based on a review of the 1988 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program audit, that "about two-
thirds of all taxpayers intended to pay their taxes correctly").
184 James Andreoni and his colleagues report that "the difference between the federal income taxes
households actually owe, and what they report and pay voluntarily on a timely basis" has remained
about the same from 1973 to 1992. Id. at 819. In 1992, the gap between taxes owed and taxes paid was
17.3%. Id.
I5 Id.
186 See Historical Tables, at http://w3.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2004/pdf/hist.pdf (the United
States Government Printing Office). According to the Tables, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development spent approximately $25 billion, the Department of the Interior $7 billion, the Department
of Justice $10 billion, the Department of Labor $48 billion, and the State Department $6 billion. Id.
187 See Andreoni et al., supra note 183, at 820 (reporting that the audit rate was 4.75% in 1965,
dropped to 0.8% by 1990, and rose to 1.7% by 1995).
88 Id. at 821 (reporting that 4.1% of those audited in 1995 were penalized).
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taxpayer noncompliance as accurately as possible. With a better under-
standing of expected taxpayer behavior, the IRS is more likely to craft poli-
cies and procedures that will deter noncompliance.
Rational choice theory predicts that when deciding whether to comply
with the tax laws, individuals will base their decisions solely on "the cost of
the tax and of the expected legal sanction from noncompliance. If the ex-
pected sanction exceeds the tax payment, the person will pay; otherwise, he
will not.'1 89 Due to the small chance of getting caught and punished, 90 the
expected sanction facing noncomplying taxpayers is low, so rational choice
theory predicts rampant noncompliance. As noted above, however, compli-
ance rates are actually quite high. 19' Thus, rational choice theory provides
only limited insight into expected taxpayer behavior.
Prospect theory's predictions about taxpayer behavior are potentially
more helpful to policymakers. Prospect theory predicts that the framing of
the tax decision will systematically influence taxpayer behavior.,92  Tax-
payers who anticipate receiving a refund from the IRS are in a "gains"
frame. Although underreporting or evasion could result in an even larger
refund, prospect theory predicts these taxpayers will "tend to avoid the risks
associated with evasion since a perceived gain is already assured."' 93 By
contrast, taxpayers who anticipate owing taxes to the IRS are in a "losses"
frame. Because "the taxpayer expecting to owe money is more likely to see
the additional payment as a loss, the probability is greater that he or she will
risk filing a fraudulent return in order to reduce the anticipated loss."'194
Elizabeth Loftus, credited with applying prospect theory to taxpayer behav-
189 Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781,
1783 (2000).
190 See Andreoni et al., supra note 183, at 821 ("The fact that most taxpayers face a low probability
of detection and small expected penalty puts the earlier statistics on noncompliance in a different light.
For small amounts of evasion, such as slightly overstating charitable deductions or failing to report mi-
nor amounts of income, the expected cost of detection would appear to be extremely low for most tax-
payers. So, we may ask, why are so many households honest, and why don't cheaters cheat more?");
Posner, supra note 189, at 1784 ("Given the low penalty for tax evasion and the audit rate, tax evasion
should be widespread.").
191 See supra note 183.
192 See Elizabeth F. Loftus, To File, Perchance To Cheat, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Apr. 1985, at 34 (first
observing this phenomenon).
193 Henry S.J. Robbenn et al., Decision Frame and Opportunity as Determinants of Tax Cheating:
An International Experimental Study, II J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 341, 344 (1990).
194 Id. at 344-45; see also Kent W. Smith & Karyl A. Kinsey, Understanding Taxpaying Behavior:
A Conceptual Framework with Implications for Research, 21 LAW & SOc'Y REV. 639, 649 (1987)
("[A]ny savings through legal or illegal tax-reducing activities that would result in a refund are framed
as gains, while taxes paid out of one's own pocket are framed as losses. Therefore, at filing time we
would anticipate more planning and risk taking to reduce money owed than to increase refunds, even
when the total tax obligation would be the same under either circumstance."); Russell H. Weigel et al.,
Tax Evasion Research: A Critical Appraisal and Theoretical Model, 8 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 215, 221
(1987) (observing that "the prospect of a large out-of-pocket cost may produce strain and consequent
evasion behavior").
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ior in a 1985 Psychology Today article, explains the decisionmaking proc-
esses of two hypothetical taxpayers, Mary (who expects a refund) and Jane
(who expects to owe the IRS additional taxes), to illustrate:
Mary is in a gain situation; she could gamble and cheat in hopes of achieving a
larger return or file an honest return. Since she will get a refund either way,
she will probably avoid the risk of cheating. Jane, on the other hand, is in a
loss situation. She owes the IRS money. She could choose to pay what she
owes, or she could gamble and cheat, in hopes of reducing what she owes.
Since she is in a loss situation, she is more likely than Mary to risk filing a
fraudulent return. 195
Scholars have collected experimental evidence that supports the pros-
pect theory account of taxpayer behavior. In one study, Otto Chang and his
colleagues gave executive MBA students a series of hypothetical tax report-
ing problems. 196 On average, the subjects were risk averse, 97 but the re-
searchers found that those "viewing tax payments as a reduction of gain
exhibited different behavior from those who viewed tax payments as certain
losses."' 19 Only 23% of the subjects who viewed the tax payments as re-
duced gains were inclined to gamble, but a substantially higher 65% of
those who viewed the tax payments as sure losses made risk-seeking tax
decisions. 199
In another study, Henry Robbenn and his colleagues conducted ex-
periments in six countries in which they asked subjects to assume the role
of manager of a small business.20 They randomly assigned half of the sub-
jects to a "gains" condition (refund) and half to a "losses" condition (pay-
ment). They asked the subjects to perform a number of tasks, including
making decisions about tax filing. Although many of the subjects did not
consciously perceive the refund as a potential gain or the taxes due as a po-
tential loss, the researchers found that "[n]oncompliance was more likely to
occur, occurred on more occasions, and involved larger amounts of money
among subjects confronting the prospect of an additional tax payment after
withholding. 20' The researchers found similar results among those sub-
jects who did perceive the decision frame the way the researchers had an-
ticipated.202
195 Loftus, supra note 192, at 37-38.
196 Otto H. Chang et al., Taxpayer Attitudes Toward Tax Audit Risk, 8 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 299, 301-
07(1987).
197 Id. at 303.
198 Id. at 307.
199 Id. at 304.
200 Robbenn et al., supra note 193, at 348-59.
201 Id. at 355.
202 With respect to this subset of their subjects, the researchers also found that "[n]oncompliance
was more likely to occur, occurred with greater frequency, and involved more money when subjects
framed their withholding status as a loss." Id. at 359.
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The prospect theory account of tax compliance is supported not only
by experimental evidence, but also by real-world empirical evidence. Rob-
benn and his colleagues reported that an IRS analysis of 1982 tax returns
demonstrated that "income tax compliance varies as a function of the size of
taxpayers' refund or balance due."203 The analysts found that "the volun-
tary compliance rate was higher (96%) for individuals whose returns
claimed a refund of more than $1,000 and lower (89%) for taxpayers facing
a 'balance due' of over $1,000. ''204 The results were even more pronounced
for business income in which "the voluntary compliance rate was 95% for
individuals anticipating a refund in excess of $1,000 versus 70% for tax-
payers who owed a balance of more than $1,000. ' '205 The researchers con-
cluded that their results "provide another piece of evidence that the
implications of Prospect Theory extend beyond hypothetical choices and
support the theory's relevance for understanding tax evasion behavior."
20 6
The theory, the experimental evidence, and the empirical evidence
suggest that taxpayers are more likely to evade or underreport if they antici-
pate owing taxes because taxpayers will perceive themselves to be facing a
loss. 20 7 The IRS is not powerless in the face of these findings. To deter
taxpayers from violating the tax code, the IRS could "increase the amounts
that are withheld from wages and other sources of income, so that more
taxpayers can expect a refund. '20 8 In other words, the IRS could attempt to
place more taxpayers in a "gains" frame prior to April 15.209 And to in-
crease its rate of detection of noncompliance, the IRS could target its en-
forcement efforts at those taxpayers who appear to have had too little
withheld, given that those taxpayers are relatively more likely than others to
evade or underreport. 210
203 Id. at 345 (citing to an unpublished report produced by the IRS Research Division).
204 Id. at 346.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 360.
207 Some taxpayers may not view the decision as this prospect theory account suggests. See, e.g.,
Phyllis V. Copeland & Andrew D. Cuccia, Multiple Determinants of Framing Referents in Tax Report-
ing and Compliance, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 499 (2002) (finding
generally that taxpayer reporting decisions are framed both by the current cash position and by expecta-
tions based on prior filing experiences).
208 Loftus, supra note 192, at 38.
209 But see John S. Carroll, Compliance with the Law: A Decision-Making Approach to Taxpaying,
II LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 319, 327 (1987) (arguing that "there are other ways to frame this situation that
makes this policy recommendation more risky, such as framing each withholding as a loss, or comparing
oneself to other people who may pay less taxes").
210 For other efforts to use prospect theory to analyze various aspects of tax doctrine, see Edward J.
McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1861 (1994); Edward J. McCaffery & Jona-
than Baron, Framing the Family: Normative Evaluation of Tax Policies Involving Household Composi-
tion (working paper, on file with author).
1145
97:1115 (2003)
HeinOnline  -- 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1145 2002-2003
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
G. Corporate Law
Corporations conduct business in competitive markets. To survive in
the competitive marketplace, corporations must, according to the traditional
rational actor account, make economically rational decisions to maximize
shareholder value.2 ' Those corporations "that depart too far or too often
from this norm will lose access to needed capital and succumb to their more
savvy competitors."21 2 The managers of corporations "are presumed to un-
derstand this and act accordingly," 213 yet managers are human and are
unlikely to make such economically rational decisions.2 14  In particular,
managers are likely to be influenced by the way their companies are per-
forming relative to salient "target points."
Through experimental research, analyses of real-world data, and inter-
views with managers, researchers have discovered that managerial deci-
sionmaking often depends on how well a corporation is performing against
some benchmark or "target point." Namely, if a corporation has exceeded a
salient benchmark, the managers charting that corporation's short-term path
are likely to make risk-averse decisions. 215 If, however, the corporation ap-
pears to be falling short of that benchmark, the managers are much more
likely to make risk-seeking decisions.21 6
Consider, for example, experiments conducted by Dan Laughhunn,
John Payne, and Roy Crum. 217  These researchers asked five groups of
managers to make a series of hypothetical risky decisions on behalf of
themselves (i.e., "investing their own money in the chosen alternatives as
211 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corpora-
tions Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 101-02
(1997).
212 Id. at 102.
213 Id.
214 Professor Henry Hu laments:
Managers in a typical, healthy, publicly held corporation should generally be risk averse, not risk-
seeking, and in just the right, shrewdly determined fashion. There is some reason to believe, none-
theless, that corporate managers have the unfortunate tendency to be human in dealing with risk.
In particular, there is some evidence of behavior consistent with predictions of prospect theory.
Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
277, 330-31 (1990). See generally Robert B. Thompson, Devil's Advocate, 30 VAND. LAW. 25, 25
(2000) (explaining that the Corporations course in law schools is "really about people and core human
emotions").
215 See, e.g., James G. March & Zur Shapira, Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking, 33
MGMT. SCI. 1404, 1413 (1987) ("In general, if one is above a performance target, the primary focus is
on avoiding actions that might place one below it. The dangers of falling below the target dominate at-
tention; the opportunities for gain are less salient. This leads to relative risk aversion on the part of suc-
cessful managers, particularly those who are barely above the target.").
216 Id. ("For decision makers who are, or expect to be, below the performance target, the desire to
reach the target focuses attention in a way that leads generally to risk taking.").
217 Dan J. Laughhunn et al., Managerial Risk Preferences for Below-Target Returns, 26 MGMT. SCI.
1238, 1242 (1980).
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well as receiving the profits and losses from them"218) or their companies
(i.e., "investing company resources in the chosen alternatives with the re-
suiting profits and losses accruing to the company"). 219 The participating
managers represented fifty-three different companies in the United States,
Canada, and Europe and had anywhere from five to thirty-five years of ex-
perience at varying levels within their companies.220 With the exception of
decisions involving losses that could potentially destroy their companies,
the managers made overwhelmingly risk-seeking decisions when faced with
below-target returns. "On an overall basis, 71% of the managers in the
study exhibited this form of behavior," the researchers explained.22' "Fur-
thermore, the observed pattern of risk preference for below target returns
was not significantly altered by the diversity of background of the different
business managers, by the context of the decision-making progress, or by
the size of the losses involved. 222
In addition to this experimental work, researchers have analyzed real-
world empirical data and found evidence of this target-point phenomenon.
Avi Fiegenbaum and Howard Thomas, for instance, examined U.S. corpo-
rations from 1960 to 1979 and found evidence that firms' decisionmaking is
influenced by target points:
[T]he main contribution of this study is that it showed that, when a target ROE
[return on equity] value is introduced at either the firm or industry level, risk
and return are negatively correlated for below-target firms and positively cor-
related for above-target firms regardless of the period or the underlying envi-
ronmental conditions. Those findings suggest, in line with the behavioral
assumptions of prospect theory, that most firms may be risk seeking when they
are suffering losses or are below targeted aspiration levels. Conversely, they
will tend to be risk averse following achievement of aspirations and targets.223
Similarly, Edward Bowman performed content analyses224 of the annual re-
ports issued by companies in three different industries 225 and found that
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at 1241.
221 Id. at 1247-48.
222 Id. at 1248. For more work like this, see John W. Payne et al., Further Tests ofAspiration Level
Effects in Risky Choice Behavior, 27 MGMT. SCL. 953 (1981); John W. Payne et al., Translation of Gam-
bles and Aspiration Level Effects in Risky Choice Behavior, 26 MGMT. SCl. 1039 (1980).
223 Avi Fiegenbaum & Howard Thomas, Attitudes Toward Risk and the Risk-Return Paradox:
Prospect Theory Explanations, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 85, 97 (1988).
224 Edward H. Bowman, Risk Seeking by Troubled Firms, 23 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 33, 37 (1982)
("Content analysis involves a systematic counting, coding, and classifying of various words or phrases
from written reports for purposes of testing or explicating some underlying phenomena.").
225 The study included eighty-two companies from the food processing industry, forty-six compa-
nies from the computer-peripheral industry, and twenty-seven companies from the container industry.
Id. at 38-39.
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"troubled companies take larger risks. 226
Finally, researchers have interviewed managers about their decision-
making. Zur Shapira in one study,227 and Kenneth MacCrimmon and Don-
ald Wehrung in another, 228 found that managers believed their decisions
were influenced by their standing vis-A-vis relevant target points. Summa-
rizing the results of these interview studies, James March and Zur Shapira
reported that:
Both the managers interviewed by Shapira and those interviewed by Mac-
Crimmon and Wehrung (1986) believe that fewer risks should, and would, be
taken when things are going well. They expect riskier choices to be made
when an organization is "failing." In short, risk taking is affected by the rela-
tion between current position and some critical reference points.
229
Legal scholars have incorporated this "target point" insight into analy-
ses of corporate law. In one article, for instance, James Cox argues that
corporate managers are more likely to engage in misconduct when they or
their companies appear to be shy of some target level of return.230 To illus-
trate, Cox describes a hypothetical manager who wants to meet her com-
pany's target sales goal and obtain a $50,000 bonus contingent on meeting
that goal. Cox further imagines that the manager can meet that sales goal if
she illegally colludes with a competitor to set prices. If she has met her
sales goal, she will choose not to collude, but if it appears she will not meet
her sales goal, prospect theory suggests she is more likely to "choose the
risk-preferring choice to collude since it has the only outcome that satisfies
her target point regardless of its potential accompanying sanctions. '23'
In another article, Jack Coffee uses the target point insight to analyze
the impact that hostile takeovers had on corporate management during the
early-to-mid 1980s. 232 Coffee observes that in the past "takeovers typically
involved larger firms digesting smaller firms" to obtain "synergistic gains,"
226 Id. at 40; see also Edward H. Bowman, A Risk/Return Paradox for Strategic Management, 21
SLOAN MGMT. REV. 17 (1980).
227 March & Shapira, supra note 215, at 1407 (citing Zur Shapira, Tisk in Managerial Decision
Making (1986) (unpublished manuscript, Hebrew University)).
228 KENNETH R. MACCRIMMON & DONALD A. WEHRUNG, TAKING RISKS: THE MANAGEMENT OF
UNCERTAINTY 139-40, 173 (1986).
229 March & Shapira, supra note 215, at 1409.
230 James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW &
CONTEMP, PROBS. 1, 5 (1997),
231 Id. at 6; see also Painter, supra note 170, at 1416 ("[P]rospect theory is a powerful tool for pre-
dicting when managers of public companies are likely to illegally conceal material facts from investors
and regulators, and also when lawyers are likely to help them do it. Prospect theory suggests that man-
agers and lawyers who evaluate disclosure decisions in a loss frame, in which concealment offers the
possibility of avoiding all or most of the threatened losses, are likely to be more risk preferring than
managers and lawyers deciding whether to conceal information simply in order to increase gains.").
232 John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 64-66 (1986).
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but that more recently, large corporations have found that they might be the
potential targets of hostile takeovers.233 Managers of these large corpora-
tions, therefore, likely raised their target points to protect themselves from
hostile bidders. Because their target points were higher, however, managers
were likely to find themselves falling short of them. Thus, managers may
have become systematically more risk-seeking because of the threat of hos-
tile takeovers.2 34 In short, "a massive 'preference reversal'-a shift in atti-
tude from risk aversion to risk preference-may have occurred within
senior corporate echelons" due to hostile takeovers. 235
H. Securities Law
Recognizing that investing in securities is fraught with risk and uncer-
tainty, cognitive psychologists and behaviotal economists have raised for-
midable challenges to the long-dominant assumption that investors,
investment managers, and brokers behave rationally. 236 Recently, legal
scholars have also begun to use cognitive psychology to analyze securities
markets, securities disputes, and securities regulation.
Donald Langevoort uses prospect theory (along with other work drawn
from behavioral economics, cognitive psychology, and social psychology) to
analyze investor-broker disputes arising out of risky investments gone bad.237
According to Langevoort, the typical investor-broker dispute arises as fol-
lows: the investor claims to be the victim of "a greedy broker abusing [her]
trust in pursuit of commission income," and the broker defends herself on the
ground that the investor chose "to take risks to satisfy a lust for wealth" and
"now cannot accept responsibility" for her rational, but unfortunate, invest-
ment decisions.238 Although Langevoort concedes that some of these disputes
do involve greedy, rationally self-interested brokers and investors, he contends
that most investor-broker disputes are a product of irrationalities or "cognitive
illusions" that lead investors and brokers to assume irresponsible levels of risk.
He argues that his "more nuanced view" of investors and brokers will lead to
"better strategies for regulating the brokerage industry ex ante. 239
Drawing on prospect theory, Langevoort contends that investors make
risk-seeking choices in part because they often perceive themselves to be
confronting prospective losses in the market.2 40 "An investor on a losing
233 Id. at 2.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 65-66.
236 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 239-350 (1991) (exploring
"quasi-rational" behavior in the financial markets).
237 Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral Eco-
nomics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627, 628-29 (1996).
238 Id. at 628.
239 Id. at 631.
240 Id. at 637-38.
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streak, for instance, may well decide that greater risk is necessary" to elimi-
nate her losses.2 4 ' Likewise, "an investor with a long-term goal of even
moderate financial security might view current investment choices in terms of
a need not to fall short of that expectation-not to lose ground. 24 2 Fear of the
"erosive effects of inflation or diminishing returns" may induce "risk taking
as necessary to perceive the status quo. 243 Even the "perception that signifi-
cant others have recently generated more wealth in their investments, or are
being offered and are likely to seize some tempting opportunity, can readily
translate into fear of loss of status." 2 4 Indeed, as we have seen recently, "a
person who has foregone investing in the early stages of what turns out to be
a bull market for stocks, or who misses a salient run-up in the price of a stock
is likely to feel substantial pressure to make up the difference. 245
Brokers, as salespeople, are likely to be skilled at manipulating inves-
tors' risk-seeking tendencies in the face of loss. 246 Moreover, brokers are
likely to take opportunistic risks when they face loss as well. Consistent
with prospect theory, Langevoort observes that "opportunistic risk-taking
behavior will be restrained" as long as "the broker is even or ahead in his or
her sales quota," but "if the broker perceives a potential for loss or fears a
failure to meet expectations, his or her willingness to take risks will in-
crease." 24 7 Junior brokers are likely to perceive themselves to be in pro-
spective loss situations because they are "subject to termination for failing
to meet quotas." 248 While senior brokers have more job security, they "are
likely to have much invested in their own sense of status." 249 In either
event, Langevoort observes, brokers, like investors, are likely to take on too
much risk when they face prospective losses.
Langevoort proposes that this "insight should inform the way in which
law and regulation approach the sale of risky securities. 250 He observes
that courts currently fall into two camps. "Protectionist" courts, which tend
to assume that brokers are greedy and rationally self-interested, impose fi-
duciary or fiduciary-like duties upon brokers, often resulting in broker li-
ability.2 5' "Gamesman" courts, on the other hand, give the brokers more
leeway in their dealings with investors because they expect that both brokers
241 Id. at 638.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 638-39. Langevoort observes that investment managers acting as agents for individual
and institutional investors are also subject to what he calls "loss framing." Id. at 643-44.
246 Id. at 656.
247 Id. at 662.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 669. For an application of his "more complicated story of joint responsibility" to some
high-profile disputes, see id. at 667-68.
251 Id. at 669.
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and investors are savvy business people who know how to look out for them-
selves. 252 Langevoort proposes a middle ground approach based on his more
nuanced understanding of the respective parties. According to Langevoort,
brokers should be held to an "implied representation of fair dealing" standard
akin to the "good faith and fair dealing" standard in contract law.253 Consis-
tent with his proposed standard, Langevoort argues that brokers should be re-
quired to "disclose all significant risk factors going to the suitability and
soundness of the recommended investment in a way that captures the atten-
tion of the competent investor. 2 54 This disclosure obligation, in turn, should
protect investors from brokers inclined to take ill-considered risks.
L Antitrust and Predatory Pricing
Economic analysis has long been applied to antitrust law, 255 but "psy-
chology, as the science of human behavior, has relevance to any aspect of
antitrust analysis that involves assumptions with respect to human behavior,
whether the assumptions relate to the behavior of humans as consumers or
as managers of business enterprises. '256 Consider, for example, predatory
pricing behavior, a topic that has long attracted the attention of antitrust
scholars.
When a firm cuts its prices in an attempt to take market share away from
competing firms, consumers benefit from the resulting lower prices on goods.
"Price cutting is a classic, and a socially desirable, form of competition.
Lower prices typically make more goods available to more people and thus
result in greater overall benefits to society. '257 When a firm cuts its prices in
an attempt to eliminate its competitors, however, consumers suffer because
the price of goods will ultimately rise when competition is eliminated:
[P]rice cutting can be used by a dominant firm with superior staying power to
drive its competitors out of business with the intention thereafter of using its
market power to restrict output, raise prices, and recoup the losses sustained in
the competitive battle and then to enjoy the fruits of monopoly profits in the
future.258
The antitrust laws are designed to promote price cutting that facilitates
252 Id.
253 Id. at 680.
254 Id. at 693; see also Robert B. Thompson, Securities Regulation in an Electronic Age: The Impact
of Cognitive Psychology, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 779, 782 (1997) ("What would securities regulation look like if
framing and other heuristics were more clearly understood? I suppose it would be to require something like
the Surgeon General's warnings on cigarette ads: 'Securities are often marketed to put you in a loss frame,
emphasizing fear of missed opportunity, thereby increasing your tolerance for risk.").
255 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978).
256 Harry S. Gerla, The Psychology of Predatory Pricing: Why Predatory Pricing Pays, 39 Sw. L.J.
755, 779 (1985).
257 Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
258 Id. at 465-66.
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competition, but to prevent price cutting that threatens competition.2 59 This
latter form of price cutting is called "predatory pricing" or "predation." Pro-
ponents of rational choice models of behavior have long argued that preda-
tory pricing is rare because the risk-seeking behavior it requires is
economically irrational.2 60 The rational choice account has been quite influ-
ential, shaping the legal doctrine in this area.261 In Matsushita Electric Indus-
trial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., for example, the Supreme Court relied on this
account when it observed that "there is a consensus among commentators that
predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely success-
ful. '2 62 In Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., its most re-
cent and "most important" predatory pricing decision, the Court reiterated
this view and affirmed a lower court dismissal of plaintiffs predatory pricing
claims.2 63 Since the Brooke Group decision, "plaintiffs have not prevailed in
a single [predatory pricing] case in the federal courts," 264 and researchers
have found that defendants have won ninety percent of the cases on dismiss-
als, summary judgments, and judgments notwithstanding the verdict. 265
Because of their implicit, if not explicit, reliance on the rational choice
theory account, courts seldom find firms liable for predatory pricing. None-
259 The Supreme Court reiterated in its most recent predatory pricing case that "the mechanism by
which a firm engages in predatory pricing-lowering prices-is the same mechanism by which a firm
stimulates competition; because 'cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of
competition ... [J mistaken inferences ... are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the
antitrust laws are designed to protect."' Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209, 226 (1993) (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (citing Mat-
sushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986))). Antitrust provisions that
prohibit predatory pricing include Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000), and Section 2(a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act, Id. § 13(a).
260 See BORK, supra note 255, at 155 (arguing "predatory price cutting is most unlikely to ex-
ist and that attempts to outlaw it are likely to harm consumers more than would abandoning the
effort"); Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 699 (1975) (arguing that "[t]he prospects of an
adequate future payoff ... will seldom be sufficient to motivate predation. Indeed proven cases of
predatory pricing have been extremely rare"); Frank Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Coun-
terstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 264 (1981) (arguing that predatory pricing is "unlikely to be
profitable given the risks faced by the predator and the responses available to rivals"); Roland H.
Koller 11, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV.
105, 105 (1971) (noting that "the standard theoretical analysis" treats predatory pricing "as a form
of non-maximizing (irrational) behavior and thus as an unlikely occurrence in the real world");
John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, I J.L. & ECON. 137, 143
(1958) ("Whereas it is conceivable that someone might embark on a predatory program, I cannot
see that it would pay him to do so .....
261 See, e.g., Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO.
L.J. 2239, 2241 (2000) (noting that the courts have continued to rely on the early rational choice theory
models of predation in their decisions).
262 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986).
263 509 U.S. 209, 940 (1993).
264 Bolton et al., supra note 261, at 2258-59.
265 Id. at 2259.
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theless, scholars have produced ample evidence demonstrating that preda-
tion occurs more commonly than rational choice theory and the courts sug-
gest. Several scholars, for example, have conducted case studies
documenting conduct consistent with predatory pricing.266 Two scholars in
particular, Richard Zerbe and Donald Cooper, analyzed forty litigated cases
from 1940 to 1982 and found evidence of predatory pricing in more than
two-thirds of such cases. 267 Still other scholars have argued that previous
efforts to measure predatory pricing, like Zerbe and Cooper's, underesti-
mate its occurrence because they focus solely on litigated cases, ignoring
"extrajudicial outcomes" like settlement. 268 If predatory pricing is eco-
nomically irrational, why does it appear to occur with some frequency?
Scholars have responded to this question in two ways. Some rational
choice scholars have challenged the very premise of this question. Relying
on "game theory" or "modem strategic theory,"269 these scholars have ar-
gued that predatory pricing is economically rational after all:
The new analysis explains predatory pricing in a dynamic world of imperfect
and asymmetric information in which strategic conduct can be profitable. Un-
der this analysis, the predator seeks to influence the expectations of an existing
rival, a potential rival, or perhaps most striking of all, the prey's creditors, to
convince the rival that continued competition or future entry into the market
will be unprofitable. 270
Other scholars have used prospect theory to explain predatory pricing
behavior. 27' A prospect theory approach assumes that firms attempt to be-
have in an economically rational fashion but may fail to do so because of
the way they frame the predatory pricing decision. Specifically, prospect
theory predicts that a firm is more likely to engage in predatory pricing be-
havior when it believes it can avoid losses in market share than when it be-
lieves only that it can gain additional market share. Harry Gerla develops
this argument in his 1985 article on the "psychology of predatory pric-
ing. '272 Gerla argues that a firm's decision to adopt a predatory pricing
strategy will depend upon whether it is: (1) a dominant firm facing eroding
market share, (2) a dominant firm facing already-eroded market share, or
(3) a rival firm seeking to capture market share.
266 See id. at 2246-47 (citing studies).
267 See Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S. Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical Comparison ofAl-
ternative Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L. REV. 655, 699-708 (1982); see also Richard 0. Zerbe & Michael
T. Mumford, Does Predatory Pricing Exist? Economic Theory and the Courts After Brooke Group, 41
ANTITRUST BULL. 949, 958 (1996).
268 Bolton et al., supra note 261, at 2246.
269 See generally id.
270 Id. at 2247.
271 Gerla, supra note 256; see also Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Predation, "Rationality,
and Judicial Somnambulance, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 811, 866-67 (1996).
272 Gerla, supra note 256.
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In Gerla's first category, a dominant firm faces a deteriorating situation
in which a rival firm is taking away its market share.273 Confronted with
this situation, a dominant firm must "either continue to absorb the almost
certain losses inflicted by the newcomer, or utilize the dominant firm's su-
perior resources by engaging in a strategy of predatory pricing. 174 Gerla
contends that the dominant firm in this situation is likely to engage in
predatory pricing to avoid the certain losses the rival will inflict upon it:
The only reasonable surmise is that managers of the dominant firm are apt to view
the situation as a choice between a small but certain continuing loss and a risky op-
tion, predatory pricing, that provides the hope of avoiding loss altogether. In short,
the managers are likely to view their situation as one involving potential losses
rather than potential gains. In perceived loss situations people tend to be risk af-
finitive. The managers of the dominant firm, therefore, are likely to be psycho-
logically predisposed toward taking the riskier option, which in this case offers the
chance of avoiding loss completely. Thus, the managers may engage in predatory
pricing even if such a course would not rationally maximize the firm's revenues.275
In Gerla's second category, a dominant firm has lost market share to a
rival firm, but those losses have stabilized.276 In this situation, the dominant
firm is likely to have adapted to its new status quo. As a consequence,
predatory pricing, if successful, will appear to the dominant firm to promise
gains in market share rather than losses. Thus, the dominant firm is
unlikely to adopt a predatory pricing strategy:
[T]he managers of a dominant firm whose market share has stabilized will likely
view predatory pricing as an opportunity for gain by wrestling the newcomer's
market share away from it, rather than an opportunity for avoiding loss. If the
managers take this view, the psychological evidence suggests that they will tend
to be risk averse to taking the risks incident to predatory pricing.2
77
Finally, in Gerla's third category, the rival firm contemplates predatory
pricing to cut into the dominant firm's market share. 278 In this instance, the
rival firm is likely to be risk averse because it will perceive itself to be fac-
ing potential gains rather than potential losses:
When the managers of a firm seek initial domination of a market, they in all
likelihood perceive their goal as a potential gain. Given that managers view
market domination as a gain rather than an avoidance of a loss, the managers
are apt to be risk averse in pursuit of market domination. Scholars who ques-
tion the existence of predatory pricing are certainly correct with respect to one
point: predatory pricing is a high-risk strategy. High-risk strategies are pre-
273 Id. at 761.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 762.
276 Id. at 763.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 765.
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cisely the type of strategy to which people seeking gains are averse. Thus, the
managers of a firm seeking new market domination are likely to avoid preda-
tory pricing as a high-risk strategy in a potential gain situation.2 79
J. Summary
Prospect theory is a valuable tool for understanding law and legal be-
havior. As the foregoing analysis suggests, prospect theory sheds light on
several doctrinal areas, from common law subjects like contracts and torts,
to statutory and regulatory subjects like tax and securities regulation. Addi-
tionally, prospect theory can illuminate environmental law,280 voting behav-
ior,281 the legislative process, 282 international relations, 283 the behavior of
auditors, 284 interpretations of jury instructions,285 lawyer-client relations, 286
and, more generally, the evolution of law and legal rules.287 In any area
where individuals must make decisions under uncertain conditions, prospect
theory is likely to aid our understanding of their behavior and the legal re-
gimes that should govern that behavior.
279 Id.
280 See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Compara-
tive Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 604-16 (1992) (applying prospect theory and other work
from cognitive psychology to analyze the use of comparative risk analysis in environmental protection).
281 See George A. Quattrone & Amos Tversky, Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of
Political Choice, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 719, 724 (1988) (using prospect theory to describe voter behav-
ior when deciding between an incumbent and a challenger).
282 See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the Tax
Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 524 (1998) ("[P]rospect theory suggests that groups will
work harder to avoid a loss than to gain a benefit. Leaders of interest groups confirm this, reporting that
they can more easily mobilize members to ward off an attack than to mount one." (citing R. DOUGLAS
ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 32 (1990))).
283 See, e.g., Jack Levy, Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations, 41 INT'L.
STUD. Q. 87 (1997) (a critical review of scholarly efforts to apply prospect theory to international rela-
tions).
284 See Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities
Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 133, 156-57, 175 (2000).
285 Darryl K. Brown, Regulating Decision Effects of Legally Sufficient Jury Instructions, 73 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1105, 1113 (2000).
286 See John M. A. Dipippa, How Prospect Theory Can Improve Legal Counseling, 24 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 81, 114 (2001) (outlining "the basic findings of prospect theory and its implica-
tions for legal counseling," which "suggest that lawyers should take a less ideological, more pragmatic
approach to studying and teaching legal counseling").
287 See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1983) ("The mathe-
matical theory of gambler's risk, recently elaborated into 'prospect theory,' suggests that a person disad-
vantaged by the application of a legal rule has a greater incentive to avoid the rule than the person
advantaged by it has to affirm its application. Whether at the planning stage, pre-trial, during litigation,
or after trial, Jack [a hypothetical defendant] has a net incentive compared to Irma [a hypothetical plain-
tiff] that will translate into his spending more money than Irma with regard to the rule. As a result, over
time, we can expect that any given initial probability of application of any rule will be downgraded by
the greater investment in legal creativity to render that rule or its application more uncertain.").
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III. LIMITATIONS
Despite prospect theory's descriptive and prescriptive value, scholars
have raised several important concerns about its use in legal analysis.
Among other concerns, scholars have questioned the external validity or
generalizability of the theory, the source(s) of reference points used in deci-
sionmaking, the possibility of differences in individual decisionmaking, and
the potential differences between individual and group decisionmakers.
A. External Validity
In contrast to rational choice theory, which presents an idealized ac-
count of decisionmaking, prospect theory is an empirical theory that pur-
ports to describe actual, not idealized, behavior. Nonetheless, critics
question whether the empiricism on which it is based is "externally valid"
or generalizable288 to the world outside the lab.289 Can prospect theory tell
us anything about the way "real people" behave in the legal system? Critics
typically worry about three external validity factors that may undermine the
usefulness of prospect theory: the subjects who participate in the experi-
ments, the lack of incentives they face, and the simplicity of experimental
designs (versus the complexity of decisionmaking in the real world). 290
1. Experimental Subjects.-Critics often contend that experimental
work lacks external validity because the participants in studies are typically
undergraduates (often enrolled in introductory Psychology classes). While
undergraduates differ from other members of the population in terms of age,
education level, and life experience, psychologists have found that they are
often a fairly good proxy for "real people."'29' Indeed, expert decisionmak-
ers often exhibit the same decisionmaking patterns as undergraduates. 292
288 "External validity is a measure of how certain we are that a relationship observed in a controlled
experiment will also be valid outside of the conditions of that experiment." ROBERT THOMAS
MALESKE, FOUNDATIONS OF GATHERING AND INTERPRETING BEHAVIORAL DATA: AN INTRODUCTION
TO STATISTICS 150 (1995).
289 See, e.g., Gerd Gigerenzer, How To Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond "Heuristics
and Biases", 2 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 83 (1991).
290 For a broader critique of the legal literature's use of prospect theory and other cognitive phe-
nomena to illuminate law and legal analysis, see Mitchell, supra note 6.
291 PLOUS, supra note 15, at 258 (reporting that "several studies have found that experts display ei-
ther roughly the same biases as college students or the same biases at somewhat reduced levels" (inter-
nal citations omitted)).
292 See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes et al., Eliminating the Hindsight Bias, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 305, 306-
07 (1988) (demonstrating that psychologists commit the "hindsight bias"); Babcock et al., supra note 52,
at 296-97 (finding that framing effects had similar effects on lawyers and nonlawyers); Craig R. Fox et
al., Options Traders Exhibit Subadditive Decision Weights, 13 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 16 (1996)
(reporting that option traders use cognitive heuristics in their probabilistic reasoning); Guthrie et al., su-
pra note 76 (demonstrating that judges fall prey to cognitive illusions of judgment); Gregory B. North-
craft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment
Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
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Moreover, many of the participants in the prospect theory studies iden-
tified in this Article were not undergraduates, but rather individuals with
expertise relevant to the domain being studied. For example, law students,
lawyers, and federal magistrate judges participated in some of the litigation
studies; 293 licensed physicians participated in the medical treatment
study;294 executive MBA students participated in some of the tax studies;
295
and corporate managers participated in some of the managerial decision-
making studies. 296 This should allay some of the concerns critics have
raised about the subjects participating in prospect theory studies.
2. Incentives.-When making decisions in the real world, individuals
generally have incentives to "get it right." Some critics suggest that real-
world decisionmakers are thus more likely to behave "rationally" than par-
ticipants in experimental studies. In fact, the evidence on the effects of in-
centives in experiments is decidedly mixed; "extrinsic incentives sometimes
increase, sometimes decrease, and sometimes have no effect on decision
quality. 297
Studies involving the use of incentives in prospect theory-based analy-
ses suggest that incentives do not induce subjects to behave rationally when
confronted with risky decisions. Based on a recent review of seventy-four
studies comparing the behavior of subjects who received no incentives,
"low" incentives, or "high" incentives, Colin Camerer and Robin Hogarth
found that "[i]n the kinds of tasks economists are most interested in, like
trading in markets, bargaining in games and choosing among risky gambles,
the overwhelming finding is that increased incentives do not change aver-
age behavior substantively (although the variance of responses often de-
creases). ' '298
PROCESSES 84, 95-96 (1987) (reporting that real estate agents fall prey to "anchoring" when estimating
real estate prices). But see Korobkin & Guthrie, A New Look, supra note 52 (finding that lawyers were
less susceptible to cognitive biases than undergraduates playing the role of litigants); Michael J. Rosz-
kowski & Glenn E. Snelbecker, Effects of 'Framing' on Measures of Risk Tolerance: Financial Plan-
ners Are Not Immune, 19 J. BEHAV. ECON. 237 (1990) (finding that financial services professionals are
prone to framing effects, though perhaps less so when making decisions on behalf of others).
293 See supra Part II.A.
294 See supra Part ll.B.3.
295 See supra Part II.F.
296 See supra Part II.G.
297 Dan N. Stone & David A. Ziebart, A Model of Financial Incentive Effects in Decision Making, 61
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 250, 250 (1995); see also Colin F. Camerer &
Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-
Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 34 (1999) (finding, based on a review of selected
studies, that "[tjhe data show that incentives sometimes improve performance, but often don't").
298 Camerer & Hogarth, supra note 297, at 8 (emphasis added). Of those studies that do find a dif-
ference, most find that higher incentives induce greater risk aversion. Id. at 23. In many of these stud-
ies, however, "there is no normative standard for optimal behavior so one cannot pass judgment on
whether incentives 'improved' performance per se." Id.
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3. Experimental Environment.-Critics also contend that it is inap-
propriate to draw inferences about the complicated world we inhabit
based on responses to simple hypothetical problems presented in con-
trolled settings. Indeed, experimental work in cognitive psychology is
generally designed to isolate the effects of one particular phenomenon,
like the framing of options, on one aspect of human behavior, like deci-
sionmaking. The fact that psychologists (and others who do similar
work) construct problems that are often quite simple does not mean,
however, that these problems do not illuminate behavior in the real
world.2 99
People are expected to consider multiple factors when making deci-
sions in the real world, but framing effects are not necessarily trumped
by these other factors. In fact, people may be more likely to rely on
framing and other cognitive shortcuts when they are confronted with
complicated rather than straightforward decisions.30 ° This possibility
suggests that framing and other phenomena of this sort might have a
greater impact on real-world decision making than on simplified labora-
tory decisionmaking. If so, the experimental work reported above might
understate rather than overstate the actual impact framing has on
decisionmaking. 30 1
Lending credence to the external validity of this experimental work
is the fact that many of the prospect theory-based observations reported
here have been confirmed by researchers studying real-world empirical
evidence. For example, Rachlinski found evidence of framing in liti-
gated cases; 32 analyses of tax-returns are consistent with the prospect-
theory account of taxpayer compliance; 30 3 several corporate law studies
of real-world decisions corroborate the prospect-theory account of
managerial decisionmaking; 30 4 and studies of settlement rates after the
adoption of comparative fault in Arkansas support the prospect-theory
299 See, e.g., David B. Wiseman & Irwin P. Levin, Comparing Risky Decision Making Under Con-
ditions of Real and Hypothetical Consequences, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 241, 243 (1996) (observing that "past research has largely supported the position that the
decision a person makes under hypothetical circumstances is a reasonably valid predictor of the decision
that person would make in the same context with real consequences"); see also id. at 248-49 ( finding in
their own studies that "subjects did not differ in their indicated preference ... as a function of whether
the consequence of their choice would or would not be incurred").
300 JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL, THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER 2 (1993) (observing that people often
make more normative choices when making simple decisions, but "[w]hen faced with more complex
choice problems involving many alternatives, people often adopt simplifying (heuristic) strategies that
are much more selective in the use of information"). But see Mitchell, supra note 6, at 1963 (noting that
in one study "simply adding pertinent social context information to standard framing-effect questions
can greatly reduce or even eliminate framing effects").
301 But see Mitchell, supra note 6 (offering quite a different view).
302 See supra Part II.A. L.a.
303 See supra Part 11.F.
304 See supra Part 11.G.
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view of the relative advantages of comparative fault over contributory
negligence.3 °5
The aforementioned concerns about the external validity of prospect-
theory analyses are certainly legitimate. Prospect-theory analyses typically
rely on experimental work conducted in the lab with college students; ex-
trapolating from such experimental results should be done with some care.
Nonetheless, the available evidence suggests that external validity concerns
about subjects, the incentives they face, and the laboratory context can be
overstated.
B. Which Reference Point(s)?
Prospect theory posits that people evaluate decision options relative to
a reference point and exhibit predictable risk preferences based on whether
the options appear to them to be gains or losses. Thus, the reference point,
whether it is the target return at which a corporation is aiming or the pre-
lawsuit state of affairs for litigants, is critical to understanding decisionmak-
ing. Indeed, as Kahneman and Tversky have observed, reference points are
important not only in decisionmaking, but also in the processes of forming
impressions and making judgments:
The dependence of impressions, judgments and responses on a point of refer-
ence is a ubiquitous psychological phenomenon. The same tub of tepid water
may be felt as hot to one hand and cold to the other if the hands have been ex-
posed to water of different temperatures. A given income may be considered
lavish or inadequate depending on whether one's earnings have recently in-
creased or decreased. 306
Reference points are often suggested by the context, but some con-
texts are more suggestive than others. When one places a hand into a
bucket of tepid water, for instance, one's assessment of its temperature
will almost invariably be affected by the temperature of one's hand.
This situation provides an obvious (and difficult to ignore) reference
point. When assessing whether one's salary is "lavish or inadequate,"
however, one might compare it not only to one's prior salary, but also to
one's expected salary, the salary that a coworker at a comparable level
makes, the median income in the United States, or any of a number of
other benchmarks.
With respect to legal decisionmaking, consider an ordinary civil case.
Litigants appear inclined to assess the settlement versus trial decision rela-
tive to the current state of affairs, but there is nothing that prevents both
litigants from assessing options relative to other reference points, such as
305 See supra Part II.B.2. For a more general treatment of the application of prospect theory to real-
world decisionmaking, see Colin F. Camerer, Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, supra note 11, at 288.
306 Kahneman & Tversky, Preferences, supra note 14, at 168.
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their best-case scenarios at trial (e.g., for plaintiff, a big verdict; for defen-
dant, a $0 verdict) or their worst-case scenarios at trial (e.g., for plaintiff, a
$0 verdict; for defendant, a big plaintiff verdict). When the parties compare
a settlement offer and the expected value of trial to their respective best-
case scenarios at trial, the options appear to constitute prospective losses,
suggesting that both parties might make the risk-seeking decision to con-
tinue litigation. In contrast, when comparing these options to their respec-
tive worst-case scenarios, both parties will perceive the options to represent
prospective gains, suggesting that both parties might make the risk-averse
choice to settle.
The bottom line is that reference points may appear fixed and im-
mutable, but often they are not. Because some situations strongly sug-
gest a reference point-for example, a corporation's publicly announced
"target return"-it is reasonable for legal analyses to assume these refer-
ence points will serve as a basis for decisionmaking. In other circum-
stances, however, people may assess decision options relative to
multiple reference points. In those circumstances, legal analyses should
either explain why one benchmark is more likely than another to serve
as the relevant reference point or incorporate multiple reference points
into their analyses. 30 7
C. Individual Differences
Prospect theory purports to describe how individuals in general make
risky decisions. Some evidence suggests, however, that there may be meaning-
ful differences across different individuals.30 8 For example, some researchers
have found measurable differences in risk preferences based on sex,3 09 cultural
307 As noted above, the status quo appears to be the natural reference point in many situations.
308 See generally Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics'Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2003).
309 See, e.g., Vickie L. Bajtelsmit & Alexandra Bernasek, Why Do Women Invest Differently Than
Men?, 7 FIN. COUNSELING & PLAN. 1, 4-5 (1996) (surveying the literature and finding "strong evidence
that women allocate their portfolios differently than men and may differ in their attitudes toward risk
taking," but expressing uncertainty about whether this is a product of true individual differences, dis-
crimination, or both); Philip Bromiley & Shawn P. Curley, Individual Differences in Risk Taking, in
RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR 87, 121 (J.F. Yates ed., 1992) (reporting that "[m]ost typically, though not
universally, studies find males take greater risks [than females]"); James P. Byrnes et al., Gender Differ-
ences in Risk Taking: A Meta-Analysis, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 367, 377 (1999) (finding, based on a
meta-analysis of risk-taking studies, that "[a]t a general level ... male participants are more likely to
take risks than female participants," but that "a more qualified interpretation of our results is to say that
gender differences varied according to context and age level"); N.S. Fagley & Paul M. Miller, Framing
Effects and Arenas of Choice: Your Money or Your Life?, 71 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 355, 363-66 (1997) (finding a framing effect among women but not among men);
Michael Siegrist et al., Risk Preference Predictions and Gender Stereotypes, 87 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 91, 99 (2002) (failing to find a statistically significant difference
between the two genders, but concluding that "[m]en were more risk seeking than women" based in part
on other studies).
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background, 31° age,3 11 personality traits, 312 and cognitive capacity. 313 When le-
gal analyses focus on discrete populations-such as a study of the impact that a
change in the social security law might have on the investing decisions of the
elderly or the influence a modification in immigration law might have on the
decisions of a particular immigrant group-they should take into account not
only the general lessons of rational choice theory (i.e., desire to maximize
gains) and prospect theory (i.e., risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for
losses), but also the available empirical evidence on the decisionmaking pro-
pensities of the relevant population.
D. Individuals Versus Groups
Most of the empirical work upon which prospect theory is based stems
from studies of individual decisionmaking,3 14 yet individuals often combine
with one another to make important decisions. In legal decisionmaking, for
example, groups, rather than individuals, might be responsible for product
310 See, e.g., Christopher K. Hsee & Elke U. Weber, Cross-National Differences in Risk Preference
and Lay Predictions, 12 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 165 (1999) (finding that Chinese subjects were sta-
tistically significantly more likely than American subjects to exhibit risk-seeking preferences in financial
decisions but not in medical and academic decisions); Elke U. Weber & Christopher K. Hsee, Cross-*
Cultural Differences in Risk Perception, But Cross-Cultural Similarities in Attitudes Toward Perceived
Risk, 44 MGMT. SCI. 1205 (1998) (finding that Chinese subjects were statistically significantly less risk
averse than American subjects); Elke U. Weber et al., What Folklore Tells Us About Risk and Risk Taking:
Cross-Cultural Comparisons of American, German, and Chinese Proverbs, 75 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 170 (1998) (reviewing proverbs from three countries and finding that Chi-
nese and German proverbs provided more risk-seeking advice than American proverbs).
311 See, e.g., J. Frank Yates & Andrea L. Potalano, Decision Making and Aging, in PROCESSING OF
MEDICAL INFORMATION IN AGING PATIENTS 31, 50 (1999) ("The literature on the possible connection
between age and risk taking is perhaps surprisingly inconsistent. Some studies find the expected in-
crease in risk aversion with age whereas others do not, with perhaps the consensus being consistent with
the expectation [of greater risk aversion].").
312 See, e.g., Irwin P. Levin et al., A New Look at Framing Effects: Distribution of Effect Sizes, In-
dividual Differences, and Independence of Types of Effects, 88 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 411, 420-25 (2002) (finding a "large and statistically significant" framing effect
in a risky choice problem and finding that certain "personal traits [as measured by the Big Five Person-
ality Inventory and the Rational-Experiential Inventory] were predictive of the magnitude of the framing
effects").
313 See generally Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Framing and
Conjunction Effects, 4 THINKING & REASONING 289, 295-99 (1998) (finding some evidence that sub-
jects with higher SAT scores were less likely to be influenced by framing effects); Keith E. Stanovich &
Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Rational Thought, 127 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
GENERAL 161, 181 (1998) (examining subject performance on various decision tasks and finding that
"many participants displayed the characteristic biases that have been observed in the literature," but also
finding "enormous individual variation on each of the tasks... and there were almost always a few par-
ticipants whose performance was almost perfectly optimal from a normative point of view").
314 This is also true of most rational choice-based analyses of law. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002)
("Economic analysis tends to focus on the decisions of individuals. This emphasis likely stems from the
underlying model of rational choice, which posits an autonomous individual who makes rational choices
that maximize his satisfactions.").
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manufacturing and consumption decisions, investment decisions, decisions
regarding corporate risk-taking, and civil litigation decisions (especially on
the defense side). Given that prospect theory describes individual deci-
sionmaking, is it appropriate for legal analyses purporting to describe and
predict group decisionmaking to rely on the theory? In other words, do
groups make decisions the same way individuals do?
Unfortunately, the experimental work on this question is muddled.
Some of the work indicates that group risk preferences are akin to the pref-
erences of the individuals in the group;315 other work suggests that groups
dampen individual risk preferences; 316 still other work suggests that groups
magnify individual risk preferences. 317 Until psychologists generate suffi-
cient experimental evidence to reach some conclusions about group deci-
sionmaking, legal scholars should be wary of assuming that prospect theory
captures the way groups behave in legal settings. 318 On the other hand, le-
gal scholars should also be wary of assuming that groups make decisions as
groups. Many groups, such as corporations, are hierarchical, and individual
group members are often assigned responsibility for certain decisions. In
circumstances where the relevant decisionmaker is likely to be an individual
rather than the group, scholars can more comfortably rely on prospect the-
ory's predictions about the "group" decision.
315 See, e.g., John Bone et al., Are Groups More (or Less) Consistent Than Individuals?, 8 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 63 (1999) (finding that pairs make risky decisions much like individuals); R. Scott Tin-
dale, Susan Sheffey & Leslie A. Scott, Framing and Group Decision-Making: Do Cognitive Changes
Parallel Preference Changes?, 55 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 470 (1993)
(finding that individuals become more risk-oriented if a majority of the group frames decision options as
losses); Glen Whyte & Ariel S. Levi, The Origins and Function of the Reference Point in Risky Group
Decision Making: The Case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 7 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 243 (1994)
(concluding that American policymakers framed options in the Cuban Missile Crisis as losses and be-
haved consistent with prospect theory's predictions regarding risk-taking in the face of losses).
316 See, e.g., Steven R. Elliot & Michael McKee, Collective Risk Decisions in the Presence of Many
Risks, 48 KYKLOS 541 (1995) (providing evidence that larger groups made more economically rational
decisions than individuals when the members had an opportunity to communicate with one another and
a collective decisions was required); Tatsuya Kameda & James H. Davis, The Function of the Reference
Point in Individual and Group Risk Decision Making, 46 ORGANIZATIONAL BE-AV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 55 (1990) (finding that the majority in a group can influence risk preference of individual
members).
317 See, e.g., Timothy W. McGuire et al., Group and Computer-Mediated Discussion Effects in Risk
Decision Making, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917, 926 (1987) ("Although they did not do so
as individuals, groups that met face-to-face made multiattribute investment choices that were risk averse
for gains and risk seeking for losses .... [O]ur data suggest that tendencies predicted by prospect the-
ory may be exacerbated in groups."); Paul W. Paese et al., Framing Effects and Choice Shifts in Group
Decision Making, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 149 (1993) (finding
evidence in two of the four studies that individual framing effects become more pronounced in groups).
318 See Mitchell, supra note 6, at 2005 ("[T]he question of whether group judgments and decisions
tend to be more or less biased than individual judgments and decisions is enormously complex and de-
fies a simple answer. Accordingly, legal decision theorists should refrain from simple conclusions about
the similarity of group and individual decisionmaking processes and outcomes.").
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CONCLUSION
Prospect theory's central insight is powerful: when making uncertain
decisions, people are more likely to take risks to avoid losses than to accu-
mulate gains. Legal scholars have used this insight to describe litigant,
lawyer, and judge behavior; to question the limits of the "reasonable per-
son" standard in tort law and the "bargain principle" in contract law; and to
identify the conditions under which firms are more likely to adopt risky
strategies and individuals are more likely to make risky investment deci-
sions. Prospect theory's central insight, not unlike the central insight of ra-
tional choice theory, is a rather blunt tool of analysis. As such, it cannot
explain the way all actors make decisions in all contexts.319 Nonetheless, it
represents a valuable refinement to the maximization assumption and
should inform law teaching, legal scholarship, and policymaking.
319 Anton Kuhberger conducted a meta-analysis of 136 studies of framing effects. Anton Kuhber-
ger, The Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions: A Meta-Analysis, 75 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 23 (1998). Based on this review, Kuhberger "corroborated the framing ef-
fect," id at 47, but found that the size of the effect across the studies was "small to moderate," id. at 42.
In a separate meta-analysis of framing studies that mirrors Tversky and Kahneman's famous "Asian-
disease problem," see Tversky & Kahneman, Framing, supra note 14, Kuhberger and his colleagues
found "significant bidirectional framing effects" across the studies. Anton Kuhberger et al., The Effects
of Framing, Reflection, Probability, and Payoff on Risk Preference in Choice Tasks, 78
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 204, 219 (1999) ("Presenting problems as
gains leads participants to choose predominantly in a risk-aversive manner (about 60% of all participants
chose the sure gain and only 40% chose the risky gain). With losses, risk seeking predominates (about
40% of the participants chose the sure loss, while 60% chose the risky loss).").
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